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Message from the Editors
As of 2015, the group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)
controlled or contested nearly all of the major population centers in
northern Iraq and Syria. Although it has since lost that territory, for a
significant period ISIS held the extensive fertile lands of Mesopotamia,
from Raqqa and Mosul to Ramadi. How did ISIS gain so much valuable
territory in such a short time? What were its goals, and how did a new
and relatively small group achieve so much, albeit temporary, success?
Michael W.S. Ryan’s case study, ISIS: The Terrorist Group that Would Be
a State, argues that ISIS is “an adaptive, learning organization” that takes
advantage of “best thinking” in guerilla warfare doctrine and learns from
U.S. operations in the Middle East. The study begins with an assessment
of the group’s formation and direction under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
in 1999 as Jama’at al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad, and continues from its establishment as an al-Qaeda affiliate pledged to Osama bin Laden through
its evolution into a self-declared “caliphate.” Ryan then evaluates the
strengths and weaknesses of ISIS as a political entity, its preferred methodologies, and its mobilization and communication strategies.
Ryan’s analysis sheds light on how Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s doctrine on
guerilla warfare was adopted by ISIS and influenced how the group organized itself and waged war. He carefully examines how ISIS leveraged
both propaganda and religious ideology to recruit followers across the
world and utilized Abu Bakr Naji’s The Administration of Savagery as a
strategic guide.
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This Irregular Warfare Studies case study, drawn extensively from primary
source materials, is among the most comprehensive works to describe
the ISIS group’s methodologies and to help explain its surprisingly rapid
rise and control over a large state-like territory. Although ISIS has lost
its physical territory in Iraq since 2015, it has continued to gain adherents in other theaters of operation. Ryan warns: “History has shown that
we should expect the ISIS/al Qaeda phenomenon to reconstitute itself
under a new name and new leadership in the event we manage to destroy
its current organization and top leadership. As long as their ideas remain
credible and even appealing to some, the threat of anarchistic violence
will remain.” To this end, he offers suggestions for counterterrorism and
counter-narrative operations at a local level, which may serve as a template to evaluate future confrontations with similar terrorist or non-state
entities seeking to become state-like through the particular methods of
local recruitment and territorial control. Ryan also argues that military
success by itself is necessary but insufficient, and must therefore be accompanied by political solutions in Iraq and Syria.
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Introduction

A still image from a May 19, 2015, Islamic State video of militants marching in Raqqa, Syria.

ISIS: Its Evolution and Influences
No lasting resolution to the ISIS threat in Syria and Iraq will be feasible until viable political solutions are found for both countries. At the time of the
writing of this case study (2017), the U.S. has proposed no such solution.
It has given priority to addressing the security challenge but has not yet
settled on an overarching strategy for either country. Instead, the U.S. and
its allies have put in place a series of military responses to local threats and
have taken advantage of targets of opportunity in both countries using coalition airstrikes. In Syria, the U.S. has launched the occasional U.S. Special
Forces mission. Additionally, the U.S. has provided military training and
some equipment to the government of Iraq and has responded to requests
for airstrikes in support of specific Iraqi military missions.
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This case study presents a net assessment of ISIS: its strengths and weaknesses.
The conclusion will propose some recommendations for degrading ISIS, both
militarily and ideologically. Clearly, ISIS is a fluid topic, subject to change;
please note that information in this case study is current as of August 2015.
It is beyond the scope of this case study to propose a political resolution to
the political crises in Syria and Iraq, which have been a breeding ground for
the group. Instead, the case study will address tactical recommendations for
defeating ISIS at the military level and will suggest a strategic approach to
countering the ideological challenge that ISIS poses to the region and beyond.
A net assessment is descriptive, not prescriptive. Developed over time within the U.S. Department of Defense, a net assessment has been described
as a practice or methodology based on asking questions from a variety of
distinctive perspectives.1 It focuses on how the enemy operates and who
the enemy is. It tries to understand how the enemy thinks about the U.S.
in order to anticipate its strategy, if not its individual actions. To conduct a
net assessment of ISIS, one needs to look at the strategic interactions of its
component parts, its internal bureaucratic behavior, and the multifaceted
nature of its strategy.
Notes
1. The basis for the perspective on net assessment is based on Paul Bracken, “Net Assessment: A Practical
Guide,” Parameters (spring 2006): 90-100.

Reproduced with permission from Jane’s Global UK Limited

CHAPTER
ONE

What’s in a Name? From Tawhid w’ al-Jihad to ISIS
ISIS developed its strategic approach within the modern jihadist tradition, which al Qaeda violently introduced to the United States with a
series of escalating attacks, culminating in the attacks of September 11,
2001. However, as an adaptive, learning organization, ISIS departed from
al Qaeda’s strategy by taking advantage of its best thinking about jihadist
lessons as codified by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, who is a major influence on the
ISIS group’s military doctrine. In addition, ISIS has used a strategic plan for
establishing an Islamic emirate, as presented in broad strokes by another al
Qaeda strategist with the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji. ISIS also has learned
from U.S. operations, especially from the use of Sunni tribes during the successful “surge” in Iraq, which came close to destroying al Qaeda in Iraq. Lessons learned from U.S. operations were the basis of the successful rebirth of
al Qaeda in Iraq under a new name and organization, now called ISIS, and
following a new strategy.

Al-Zarqawi: Founder, Tawhid w’ al-Jihad
On June 8, 2006, in a remote area in the vicinity of Baquba, north of
Baghdad, American F-16 aircraft targeted a jihadist “safe house” with two
500-pound bombs, causing extensive damage and killing its most infamous
inhabitant, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi. Major General William Caldwell,
U.S. military spokesmen in Iraq, stated that Iraqi police arrived first on
the scene, followed by U.S. Special Forces. The killing of the Iraqi jihadist
followed intelligence information about the presence of one of al-Zarqawi’s
known associates, Sheik Abd al-Rahman; tips received from Iraqi residents
in the surrounding area led to the successful operation. Troops had been on
the ground watching for al-Zarqawi. Major General Caldwell further stated
that Rahman “was brought to our attention by somebody within the network of Zarqawi’s.”2 In fact, the successful operation came after Jordanian
authorities arrested members of al-Zarqawi’s network and, more importantly, after many Iraqi fellow insurgents had grown to loathe their bloody
comrade-in-arms enough to act as informants.
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Al-Zarqawi’s death was the culmination of an American search for one of
the most ruthless Salafi jihadist leaders, who had an American bounty on
his head of $25 million, an amount equal to the reward offered for Osama
bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri. The terrorist leader had been
responsible for the killing of a U.N. envoy, numerous assassinations in Iraq
and Jordan, and countless killings of noncombatants, bombings of mosques
and Islamic shrines, and shocking video beheadings. It was to be hoped
that his death, praised by his many enemies, would lead to a weakened al
Qaeda effort in Iraq. President George W. Bush, however, sounded a sober
note while praising the operation: “We can expect the sectarian violence to
continue. Yet, the ideology of terror has lost one of its most visible and aggressive leaders and it provides an opportunity for the new government to
turn the tide in the country.”3
Because so many conflicting reports exist on a man who has become
mythic, establishing the facts of al-Zarqawi’s life is problematic. What is
told about him, however, shows a pattern that is important for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the ISIS group: a lost young Muslim
without a traditional Islamic religious foundation who becomes a zealous adherent of a radical jihadist group to find salvation through violence
against the established order. In effect, the wayward young man becomes
a fearless fighter against everyone outside his group, but the very zeal that
gives him his strength is also difficult to control and alienates the population he needs in order to succeed.
The man known by the jihadi nom de guerre Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was
born into poverty in the Jordanian town of Zarqa as Ahmad Fadil Nazal
al-Khalayleh circa October 1966. Despite his humble circumstances, he is
reported to have belonged to a prominent Bedouin tribe, the Bani Hassan.
Like many young men who later become strict Salafi jihadis, al-Zarqawi in
his younger years did not show the influence of Islamic morals. He dropped
out of school, drank alcohol heavily, sported tattoos, and engaged in general rowdiness. He was a taciturn, semi-literate, petty thief and gangster.4
According to some accounts, when he was only 15, al-Zarqawi participated
in the violent robbery of a relative’s home, resulting in that relative’s death.
People of Zarqa remember him as a bully, a thug, and even a pimp.5
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Whether to escape Jordan or because of the lure of adventure, al-Zarqawi
travelled to Afghanistan for the first time in 1989. He may have had a religious motivation, but the Soviet Union had withdrawn from Afghanistan,
leaving only other Muslims to fight. One who knew al-Zarqawi remembers
him as an utterly fearless fighter who seemed to put himself in the midst of
the most dangerous situations:
He wasn’t very religious during that time. In fact, he’d only “returned” to
Islam three months before coming to Afghanistan. It was the Tablighi
Jamaat [a proselytizing missionary group spread across the Muslim world]
who convinced him—he had thirty-seven criminal cases against him by
then—that it was time to cleanse himself. 6

Afghanistan was a formative influence for al-Zarqawi. He claimed that the
jihadist icon Abdullah Azzam was a great influence, but perhaps the most
important event in the formation of his ideology was his meeting with fellow Jordanian and one of the most influential ideologues of Salafi jihadism,
Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Al-Maqdisi is the author of many jihadist
books and treatises, including the influential jihadist tract Millet Ibrahim
(The Religion of Abraham). Al-Maqdisi is important not only because he
was al-Zarqawi’s foundational tutor but also because of his later role as a
critic of his pupil and the ISIS group his student founded.7
Al-Zarqawi remained in Afghanistan until 1992, when he returned to
Jordan, supported intellectually by al-Maqdisi and a handful of other jihadists to invigorate a Jordanian jihadist group that opposed the monarchy
and democracy while calling for the killing of Jews and Christians. It was
here the term Tawhid (monotheism) first appeared as a name he favored
as a sort of precursor to his group, which exploded onto the scene after the
U.S. invasion of Iraq. At some point al-Maqdisi and al-Zarqawi changed the
name of the group from Tawhid to Bayat Imam (Allegiance to the Imam).
Reportedly, al-Zarqawi was jailed in Jordan in 1993 for weapons possession
and remained incarcerated with al-Maqdisi and other opposition elements
until a general amnesty in 1999 freed him.
Prison was an important school for the young jihadist. He made significant
contacts, and became a feared leader. His jihadist group grew in prison and
on the streets outside as a kind of religiously sanctioned criminal gang. In
2000 he fled again to Afghanistan, now the leader of Jama’at al-Tawhid w’
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al-Jihad (The Group for Monotheism and Jihad). For the first time as a
leader, he met Osama bin Laden, who was apparently repelled by the crude
brawler, more talented with a knife than he was articulate. One hears that
bin Laden did not trust al-Zarqawi because of potential infiltration of his
group by the famed Jordanian intelligence apparatus, but hoped to use him
in some capacity, a motivation no doubt shared by al-Zarqawi himself. This
time in Afghanistan, al-Zarqawi ran his own training camp near the Iranian
border, which was separate from al Qaeda although it received funds from
bin Laden’s organization, probably on the recommendation of the military
chief, the Egyptian Sayf al-Adel. Al-Zarqawi did not pledge allegiance to
bin Laden in Afghanistan.8
With the fall of the Taliban and the dispersal of al Qaeda and its followers
following a quick and effective campaign by U.S. forces and their Afghan
allies, al-Zarqawi made his way to Iran before migrating in 2002 to the
Kurdish area of Iraq. There, he teamed up with a small Kurdish jihadist
group, Ansar al-Islam (Partisans of Islam), and prepared for the expected
American invasion.9 Now a full-blown jihadi leader with considerable battle
experience and violent charisma, al-Zarqawi started to build his Jama’at
al-Tawhid w’ al-Jihad into the scourge it would become after the 2003 U.S.
invasion. He targeted the international community, the United Nations,
foreign contractors, American forces, and especially the Shia community.
A harbinger of ISIS, al-Zarqawi’s group specialized in the new media with
videos of lurid beheadings, constant Internet communications, and hyper
violent sectarian killings featuring gruesome methods like using electric
drills against skulls. He attacked mosques, sacred shrines, and public
gatherings of all kinds. His message and methods such as suicide bombing
inflated his capabilities in the imaginations of many, including U.S. officials. In fact, however, of the five groups of insurgents against American
forces and the successor government to Saddam Hussein, al-Zarqawi’s was
the smallest and arguably the weakest. While his group was composed of
some Iraqis and foreign fighters, the other insurgent groups included Iraqis
from Saddam’s regime, various nationalists, tribes, and local jihadist groups.
Whether or not the U.S. inflated al-Zarqawi’s importance, his place in the
jihadist pantheon would be fixed by his death, and he would become the
mythic hero for the organizations that followed in his line.10
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Al-Zarqawi’s group was a successful magnet for foreign jihadi fighters. By
2004, the insurgency in Iraq had deprived al Qaeda’s ill-fated insurgency
in Saudi Arabia (begun in 2003) of the recruits bin Laden expected to be
available for his highest-priority effort, overthrowing the Saudi monarchy. Saudi jihadists and their preachers wanted to fight Americans, who
had pulled out of the kingdom just weeks before the launch of al Qaeda’s
insurgency. If a jihadi wanted to fight Americans, he went to Iraq. By 2004,
the al Qaeda effort in Saudi Arabia was already on the road to defeat, so bin
Laden and al-Zawahiri negotiated with al-Zarqawi the terms of affiliation
with al Qaeda. The Tawhid group became the commander of the al Qaeda organization in the “land of the two rivers,” the jihadist name for Iraq.
In the West, the organization was simply called al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
Despite his pledge to bin Laden, al-Zarqawi was fully independent and did
not follow direction from either bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, who became
increasingly concerned about his indiscriminate violence against other
Muslims as a course that would inevitably backfire. Referring to the videos
of beheadings, al-Zawahiri presciently advised, “Among the things which
the feelings of the Muslim population who love and support you will never
find palatable are the scenes of slaughtering the [Muslim] hostages.”11
It is important to view al-Zarqawi’s career as a model on multiple levels for
the Islamic State group. Again and again, one can perceive the mafia-like
criminal enterprise beneath the extremist religious pretensions. Time and
again, ISIS uses religion to justify violent attacks against noncombatants,
which most Muslims find inexcusable, while the apparatus for terrorism is
funded by bank robberies, looting of artifacts, the slave market, kidnapping,
and extortion, as well as smuggling and trafficking of all kinds, including
petroleum, antiquities, and even people. The inventive use of social media,
publicizing atrocities resembling what nineteenth-century anarchists called
the “propaganda of the deed” to attract recruits to the movement, and the
preference for the knife over the gun or sword for wanton executions are all
traits of al-Zarqawi, a man who was more comfortable with the knife than
with the Kalashnikov. So it should not be surprising that after his 2006
death in an American airstrike, his organization maintained many of his
traits and tactics, including the penchant for changing the name of his organization when circumstances warranted.
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From Al Qaeda in Iraq to the Islamic State in Iraq to ISIS
In January 2006, AQI formed what was called the Mujahedeen Shura
(advice) Council. Through it, the group hoped to draw in local jihadist
groups, which were estranged from al-Zarqawi’s indiscriminate violence
and violation of tribal customs. The council was not effective. After al-Zarqawi’s death, AQI became the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) in mid-October, a
designation that went beyond anything al Qaeda had claimed for itself and
to which a number of local jihadist groups and other insurgents objected.
The new name in effect declared the transnational Salafi jihadist group the
core of a state to replace Iraq and demoted other factions of the insurgency
to supporters of the new state.
AQI’s leadership had become blurred even before ISI was declared. The new
leader, whose existence was questioned by many observers, was Abu Omar
al-Baghdadi. The more likely leader was a man with the nom de guerre Abu
Hamza al-Muhajir. Some argued that both names were aliases for an Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masry, who was close to al-Zawahiri.12 In any case, both
Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir apparently were killed
during a joint raid by Iraqi and American forces on April 18, 2010. The
general decapitation operations continued across Iraq. In June 2010, the U.S.
commander in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, told a Pentagon news conference
that 80% of ISI leaders had been killed or captured.13
However, at the nadir of ISI’s fortunes in June 2010, a new and apparently
much more effective leader emerged—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was
soon to become known to his followers as Caliph Ibrahim. Unlike al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda’s top leadership, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was not only an
experienced field jihadi but also claimed to have received a religious education, with the equivalent of a Ph.D. in Islamic law. He had been captured by
American forces in 2004 and interned in Camp Bucca, but was released in
less than a year because he was not considered important enough or dangerous enough to keep in custody. Although ISI was significantly weakened by
2010, its foreign leadership had been replaced with Iraqis like al-Baghdadi.
He was born Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri near Samarra, Iraq, in 1971.
Most of al-Baghdadi’s biography, however, should be seen as more propaganda than history; ISI spokesmen and clerics carefully crafted his biography to
match the preferred characteristics of a caliph. Thus, he was described as a
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descendent of the Prophet Mohammad, a member of the Prophet’s tribe, the
Quraysh, and both a man of religion and a leader in battle. If propaganda
and organization may be considered al-Baghdadi’s greatest strengths as a
leader, his clandestine nature is no doubt his greatest survival skill.
Al-Baghdadi and his closest circle planned a comeback strategy that could
be rolled out as U.S. forces pulled out of combat and then left Iraq. In 2011,
two significant events occurred: the anticipated withdrawal of American
forces from Iraq and the unanticipated full-scale insurrection against Bashar
al-Assad in Syria in the context of the Arab Spring. Still nominally affiliated
with al Qaeda, al-Baghdadi funded and sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani into
Syria in August 2011 to set up an organization that became operational long
before it emerged as Jabhat al-Nusra in January 2012 in Aleppo.14
Al-Jolani was a Syrian who took his time to set up a credible insurgent organization viewed by other rebels as both effective and authentically Syrian.
He hid his allegiance to al Qaeda and ISI. It appears that he was following
a strategy championed by al-Zawahiri, very much Mao’s or Che Guevara’s
strategy of seeking local support for guerrilla warfare against a strong central
government, perceived as tyrannical. This was not new to al Qaeda and
belonged as much to bin Laden as it does to al-Zawahiri, but it was more
successful than al Qaeda’s previous attempts in Saudi Arabia or North
Africa. Moreover, it had the advantage initially of falling outside of American
concern. How did all that change?
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been part of AQI and ISI, quietly learning and organizing. He had likely never been important enough to pledge allegiance to
al-Zawahiri, although his allegiance had been assumed and he had no reason
to break with the organization. He also either felt no need to ask permission
or at least thought it unwise to when, in April 2013, he declared that he had
formed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a single state.
He must have felt strongly prepared with arrangements with tribal groups
in Iraq and the solid support he had within ISI leadership and rank and file.
He was fulfilling not only al-Zawahiri’s call for an Islamic emirate in the
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heart of Muslim lands but also al-Zarqawi’s visions of the rebirth of Imad
al-Din al-Zangi’s emirate. This stretched from Mosul to Aleppo and marked
the “turning point in favor of the Islam” during the Second Crusade.15 In
addition, as the propagandist-in-chief, al-Baghdadi saw the utility of the
popular prophesies calling for an Armageddon in an area north of Aleppo
called Dabiq and the associations with the hero Saladin, who defeated the
Christians and overturned the Shia caliphate in Egypt.
The wildly successful al-Jolani did not want to be merged into the new organization and appealed to al-Zawahiri for help. In June 2013, al-Zawahiri
called for ISI to fight in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra to fight in Syria, without
merging. After all, there was no need to merge when both were part of the
umbrella of al Qaeda. When al-Baghdadi rejected al-Zawahiri’s unenforceable decision, the al Qaeda chief in October 2013 formally declared ISI,
now ISIS, to be separate from al Qaeda in every sense.16
ISIS, however, refused to be disbanded. Using traditional guerrilla tactics
coupled to semi-conventional army tactics, it became the most successful
jihadist group in Syria and set about setting up a proto-state with its capital
in al-Raqqa. ISIS mainly avoided Syrian regular forces, which were slowly
grinding down the Syrian insurgents in a costly war of attrition. ISIS fought
only when it could win, and that was mostly against other jihadist groups,
including Jabhat al-Nusra. After securing its base in Syria, ISIS focused its
attention on Iraq in June 2014.
The newly energized group reactivated old networks within major cities and
surrounding areas in the majority-Sunni provinces and proceeded with a
jihadist version of blitzkrieg. The ultimate prize was strategically and historically significant Mosul, which fell to ISIS on June 10, 2014. About 800 to
1,000 ISIS fighters took the city of two million people when Iraqi forces
comprising two divisions of approximately 30,000 soldiers fled after initial
skirmishes.17 In the following days, ISIS went on to capture a number of
strategic Sunni towns, such as Tikrit, and the oil refinery town of Baiji. Soon,
most of the so-called Sunni triangle was under attack or under ISIS control.
The lightning campaign was so successful that on the first day of Ramadan
( June 28), the spokesman for ISIS declared that the Khilafah (caliphate) had
been revived under the Caliph Ibrahim, the Commander of the Faithful,
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previously known as Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.18 The Sykes-Picot era borders
between Syria and Iraq were erased and the Islamic State was born, bearing
the slogan “Remaining and Expanding.”

Analytical Framework: Jihadist Strategy and
Social Movement Theory
There is no doubt that ISIS is heir to al Qaeda’s legacy. ISIS has adopted
al Qaeda’s theory and doctrine of revolutionary war and the strategy and
tactics derived from classical guerrilla warfare doctrine as practiced by Mao
Tse Tung and other revolutionary guerrilla warfare theorists. In the late
1990s, a jihadist theorist who adopted the pseudonym Abu Ubayd alQurashi, and was later part of al Qaeda, defined revolution as:
a comprehensive and fundamental change to the political order, social
structure, economic ownership, and the standing social order. Revolution also means the attempt of a nongovernmental group to take control
of the government in order to establish a new political, social, and
19
economic structure.

Both al Qaeda and ISIS are attempting such an overthrow of the existing
order on a global basis. Both organizations not only intend to revive the
ancient Islamic caliphate based on the model that existed in the seventh century; they also want to expand its geographic scope beyond all historic precedents. To answer the question of whether ISIS is Islamic or a perversion
of Islam, one may say with confidence that ISIS, like al Qaeda, is pursuing a
revolution within Islam first; after winning that war, both organizations intend to impose the results of this revolution on the rest of the world. As one
would expect, much of what makes ISIS the group it has become is identical
to al Qaeda as Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri conceived it.
Like the current al Qaeda organization, ISIS is influenced by two major
jihadist authors, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Bakr Naji. Al-Suri is best
known for his magnum opus, The Global Call to Islamic Resistance, which
documents modern jihadist history and makes recommendations for the
future, including a theory of small-unit and individual terrorism, often referred to as lone-wolf terrorism by Western authorities. Pseudonymous Abu
Bakr Naji, also a member of al Qaeda, wrote a important strategic manual,
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The Administration of Savagery, that both al Qaeda and ISIS are known to
use to give recruits a broad overview of the strategy to create the modern
Islamic emirates that will replace existing governments. Both authors/
strategists provide extensive materials to aid understanding the similarities
and differences between ISIS and al Qaeda, as well as their strengths and
weaknesses. However, if the two groups’ identities are shared to such a great
extent, how does ISIS differ from al Qaeda?
To begin to answer this question, it is useful to examine ISIS in light of
the elements of a template developed by Abu Mus’ab al-Suri based on his
exhaustive analysis of historical jihadist organizations from an insider’s perspective. He identified five prerequisites for a clandestine jihadist group:
1. Manhaj (program or methodology): How do they apply their belief
structure to society? What is the concept and driving ideology to
which its members adhere?
2. Qiyadah (leadership): Who are they? What are their connections to
other forces hostile to democracy and the United States?
3. Mukhattat (strategy or road map): Are they following a recognizable
pattern or strategic plan to achieve goals?
4. Tamwil (funding): What are their sources? How do they identify the
means to achieve their goals?
5. Bay’ah (allegiance): Is their allegiance to a local or external individual,
or to an external group?20
After examining ISIS by applying an insider’s analysis, an outsider’s view
may be obtained by using concepts derived from social movement theory
(SMT). SMT is not a single theory; rather, it is a broad term used to capture
the various interdisciplinary approaches within social science to examine
why and how social movements form, mobilize resources, frame issues, and
use networks to affect a social or political outcome. Much of SMT is irrelevant to the study of ISIS and jihadism in general. However, scholars have
used specific SMT concepts to study Islamic activism with some success.21
The three concept pairs that are most useful to the analysis of al Qaeda and
ISIS are culture and framing; violence and contention; and networks and
alliances. Culture and framing is most useful for analysis of the ISIS group’s
successful propaganda and mobilization strategy. The use of violence in
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political contention is an important barometer of the level of violence used
by ISIS to achieve its strategic goals of capturing and holding territory in
the heart of traditional Muslim lands. Similarly, the distinction between
networks and alliances can explain how ISIS and its components can form
and break alliances at the strategic level while sharing the same networks
with other groups at a tactical level, whether the networks involve criminal
smuggling enterprises or shared guerrilla operations.

Discussion Questions
1 When al-Baghdadi sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani to Syria and funded
his startup organization, this organization initially fell outside of
American concern. What steps might be taken to help focus on and
prevent similar startups?
2. How might the U.S. and its allies have better exploited the emerging
split between al-Baghdadi (ISIS) and al-Jolani (al-Nusra)?
3. By killing al-Zarqawi, the U.S. severely weakened the capabilities of al
Qaeda in Iraq, yet only a few years later, al-Baghdadi was able to revive
AQI and radically expand its size and influence under the label of IS.
What factors account for this dramatic success?
4. The “surge” in Iraq came close to destroying AQI. What might have been
some cost-effective steps the U.S. could have taken to finish the job?
5. ISIS has destroyed the Sykes-Picot border between Syria and Iraq,
established by France and Great Britain after World War I. Can the
borders ever be redrawn as they once were? Would a different configuration be achievable today? If so, what?
6. How can al-Suri’s five prerequisites for a clandestine jihadist group—
program, leadership, strategy, funding, and allegiance—be used to
analyze Islamic State’s strengths and vulnerabilities?
7. Some analysts have referred to ISIS as generating a civil war within
Islam. How does al-Qurashi’s definition of revolution apply?
8. Is ISIS fomenting a civil war for leadership in a territory or establishing
the basis for a revolution? Explain.
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CHAPTER
TWO

How ISIS Adapts al Qaeda’s Doctrine and Strategy
of Guerrilla Warfare
Most accounts of ISIS military operations in Syria and Iraq tend to emphasize the lurid brutality shown to its victims rather than its less newsworthy
tactics. In this context, ISIS appears to be quite different from al Qaeda, at
least in theory. At the same time, a careful examination of ISIS operations
reveals that its military and political doctrine comes from the documented
experiences of decades of jihadist insurrections, as interpreted by al Qaeda
ideologues. ISIS learned from these experiences vicariously and added its
own formative lessons from its own losses to U.S. and allied forces in Iraq to
create a new approach to creating its so-called Islamic state and caliphate.

Guerrilla Doctrine: Lessons Learned
In the autumn of 2001, Alan Cullison, on assignment from the Wall Street
Journal, ventured into northern Afghanistan to write about the U.S.-assisted war against the Taliban. Cullison’s historic trip almost ended in one of
the steep passes through the Hindu Kush mountain range. The old pickup
truck the journalist had rented lost its brakes on a steep hill, crashed into
the back of a Northern Alliance fuel truck, and turned over onto its side to
continue its skid. The baggage slid into the gorge. Miraculously, none of the
passengers, including “a Japanese journalist, two Afghan interpreters, the
driver, and a shoeless boy who had been riding on the roof and wiping dust
from the windshield,” 22 were seriously injured. One of Cullison’s interpreters, however, suffered a sharp blow to the ribs from what turned out to be
the journalist’s laptop, which was destroyed in the collision.
Finding himself in Kabul with other journalists covering what was the
downfall of the Taliban regime without his laptop, Cullison soon wearied
of dictating dispatches over his satellite phone and set out to find a new
computer in a city in which that was a rare commodity. After a series of
inquiries, the journalist finally found an enterprising thief, who had been
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watching the al Qaeda offices. Every day, Mohammad Atef, al Qaeda’s military chief, entered the office building carrying a laptop computer. On the
day before al Qaeda fled Kabul before the Northern Alliance and American
entry into the city, the thief climbed over the wall surrounding the building and found the laptop and a desktop computer, which he took. Cullison turned the newly purchased computers over to U.S. authorities, who
examined them before returning both. The laptop was curiously empty, but
the desktop, which had belonged to Ayman al-Zawahiri, contained almost
1,000 documents dating to as early as 1997.
These documents included working papers, letters, business forms, checklists for interrogations, and a draft of al-Zawahiri’s unpublished writings.
One of the working papers, which seemed to be written for the al Qaeda
leader rather than by him, was an untitled treatise on guerrilla warfare filed
under the file name ALKAER in a folder entitled “security.” A close examination of this untitled manuscript reveals that large sections are verbatim,
unattributed quotes from the Arabic translation of American Robert
Taber’s book The War of the Flea, thus linking the thought of al Qaeda’s
top leadership to the study of twentieth-century left-wing guerrilla insurrections inspired by the writings and examples of revolutionary leaders like
Mao Tse-tung, Che Guevara, and Vietnamese general Vo Nguyen Giap.
Although the manuscript found in al-Zawahiri’s computer was anonymous,
it is most likely the work of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri. The style of writing and
presentation resembles his extensive published works; moreover, al-Suri
taught Taber’s book in lectures on guerrilla warfare in Peshawar and the
training camps in Afghanistan, and refers to Taber’s book as the best work
on guerrilla warfare. Major al Qaeda strategists refer to it as well. The book
can be found online in its Arabic translation as The War of the Oppressed
with al-Suri’s commentary in the footnotes. The word translated as “oppressed” in Arabic may also be translated literally as “those deemed to be
weak”; thus, the war of the guerrilla is the war of those who are deemed to
be weak, like the insignificant flea, but who are actually a deadly force.
One of the strengths of Taber’s book that al-Suri seems to have absorbed is
that it documents what makes revolutionary wars succeed and what makes
them fail. Al-Suri spent years analyzing why jihadist insurrections gener-
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ally failed, and his studies on Algeria and Syria, as well as his 2004 Call to
Global Islamic Resistance, emphasize the importance of learning from past
mistakes.23 Al-Suri believed that jihadists following the Muslim Brotherhood
model had not studied previous examples of jihadist struggles to learn from
their mistakes as well as their rare successes. His commentary has been influential in al Qaeda’s thinking from its earliest days until today, and this work
can be considered to have guided Syrian rebels against Bashar al-Assad. AlSuri influenced al-Zarqawi and should be seen as a major influence on ISIS.
The following description of the stages of guerrilla warfare is from this case
study author’s translation of introductory material of the ALKAER document, before introducing examples from Taber’s book.
First Stage: Attrition
The first stage of guerrilla warfare is described as composed of classic hitand-run tactics used by guerrillas in insurrections, in preparation for the
larger struggle to come. The mujahedeen’s aim here to weaken the central
government’s hold on the periphery. The ALKAER document describes
this stage as the equivalent of Mao’s metaphor of the “war of the flea” in
which the weak flea, by means of its escalating numbers and numerous
bites, first drives the powerful but helpless dog mad, and eventually kills it.
The most important component of this stage, however, is political activity
and propaganda to gain the support of the population.
Second Stage: Equilibrium
“Equilibrium” is the somewhat misleading term that describes the evolution of a guerrilla war (or war of resistance) into a stage in which the mujahedeen have acquired heavy weapons and begin to form more conventional
or semi-conventional forces. These forces are strong enough to attack larger
enemy forces, well-defended military installations to which government
forces have withdrawn, and even cities. Meanwhile, guerrilla attacks continue as before, and political/propaganda operations continue or increase.
Third Stage: Decision
Stage three is characterized by a decisive battle or series of battles leading
to the total defeat of the government and the surrender or flight of government forces. The ALKAER document points out that this stage is almost
never reached because governments tend to collapse and their forces surrender before the decisive battle.
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In addition to presenting this brief description of the three stages of guerrilla warfare, the ALKAER author continues to demonstrate that the correct
approach to this type of warfare is not academic and is not as tidy as the
description would suggest. The author of the document points out that the
concept may succeed in one land and not in another: the experience of one
people with insurrection is not necessarily transferable to another people
or another country. Geography, economics, and even the population’s
susceptibility to ideology vary from country to country. The watchword
for success is flexibility and the ability to adapt to local circumstances in
executing a strategic plan, a lesson that ISIS has clearly learned and one that
has allowed it to have more success in a short period of time.
The influence of al Qaeda’s thinking on ISIS can be seen in the adaptation
of Mao’s doctrine that guerrillas must be prepared to trade space for time.
ISIS generally is ready to surrender one place in order to retreat and gain
time to regroup, rebuild, and attack again in another place. This approach
has the net effect of hurting its enemy’s morale and confidence at the same
time as it builds morale among ISIS troops. The ALKAER document
clearly states this concept:
We need to gain time to obtain new guerrilla units and supporters; and
we need to gain time to obtain the people’s trust. We need to gain time
to attack the regime politically—politics before military as the saying
goes—the mere existence of a guerrilla in a district in itself is a victory and
24
challenges the regime. Therefore, we sacrifice space to obtain time.

The three-stage guerrilla war described in ALKAER shows the strong influence of Mao and Che Guevara.25 It is representative of the three-stage descriptions of jihadist warfare in major al Qaeda writers on the subject, which ISIS
adapted for its strategy in Syria and Iraq. The importance of gaining time
to produce the political outcome ISIS desires cannot be overstated. To
cite just one circumstance, one can see that ISIS generally uses its guerrilla
strategy and tactics to gain time and break the momentum of the political
military narrative against it. One can see this in periods when ISIS has lost
significant battles like Kobane in Syria or Tikrit in Iraq. To counter the coalition narrative after losing Tikrit to the Iraqi government (aided by American
air power), for example, ISIS moved on another axis to achieve a surprise success and drove Iraqi forces out of Ramadi. To achieve this, it relied on suicide
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bombers in explosive-laden trucks and small groups of hardened guerrilla
fighters to rout an arguably more powerful force, in greater numbers and with
superior equipment. While ISIS may not have expected to be able to hold
Ramadi indefinitely, it changed the narrative of losing to coalition forces and
gained time to rebuild morale and recruit more forces.
To develop a greater understanding of ISIS’s doctrine for insurgency, it
is helpful to examine another of al-Suri’s works that analyzes lessons he
learned from the Muslim Brotherhood’s previous insurgency in Syria.

Al-Suri’s Lessons Learned from Syria
As a young man, al-Suri participated in the Muslim Brotherhood’s insurrection in Syria, which ended in failure in 1982. He established his bona
fides as a jihadist strategist with his lengthy history of the insurgency,
published in 1991 as The Islamic Jihadist Revolution in Syria. Part of
that history was published as a separate manual entitled “Observations
on the Jihadist Experience in Syria,”26 which he used for training jihadists. Al-Suri detailed what he called seventeen bitter lessons from the
failed insurgency and the one positive lesson from the jihadist perspective: namely, that an organization could mobilize a Muslim population
under the Muslim banner, even against great odds. However, mobilizing
the population without a great deal of preparation was a betrayal of that
population by the jihadist leadership.
The major failure by the Muslim Brotherhood was the lack of a strategic
concept and plan for victory against the regular and irregular forces of a
Middle Eastern praetorian state. Not having an overarching concept led to
all the bitter lessons that al-Suri judged to be why the insurrection failed.
For example, without an overarching narrative and strategic plan, leaders
cannot explain their ideology and objectives to their foot soldiers; they
cannot transform Salafi preachers into jihadists; and consequently they
are unable to devise a powerful internal and external propaganda program,
without which any guerrilla war is bound to fail. Al-Suri also believed that
a successful revolution, which is what Salafi jihadists seek, must learn from
previous lessons.
It is clear that both ISIS and al Qaeda have addressed these mistakes. Both
have a strategic concept that works for them, although ISIS has been able

26 irregular warfare studies
to leapfrog al Qaeda in propaganda. Another interesting observation is that
the Muslim Brotherhood was thought to have accepted too many recruits
when the Syrian regime pressed them militarily, and that this allowed the
regime’s intelligence services to infiltrate the group to gain tactical and
strategic intelligence. Clearly both ISIS and al Qaeda have well-conceived
vetting programs and keep their inner circles small. Furthermore, both ISIS
and al Qaeda execute accused spies on a regular basis as a warning to others.
A good indication of why the Free Syrian Army (FSA) has done relatively
poorly, relative to either al Qaeda or ISIS, in the current uprising against
the Syrian government is that they have not learned from al-Suri’s observations. For example, the FSA’s political leadership is outside the theater of
operations; they depend on external states for support; they deal regularly
with neighboring regimes; and of course they are devoid of any discernible
ideology. Also, it is unclear what they would do if, contrary to expectations,
they were to succeed against the Syrian government. Both al Qaeda and
ISIS have been able to engage religious leaders successfully, and both have
been able to forge alliances with powerful local tribes, even though these
alliances could well be fragile in the longer term.
There are lessons outlined by al-Suri that ISIS has addressed better than al
Qaeda. For example, al-Suri warned against engaging in a long war of attrition with the central government. So far, ISIS has generally avoided long
set battles and sieges against either the Syrian or the Iraqi governments,
whereas al Qaeda has engaged in sieges. The glaring exception for ISIS was
their disastrous attempt to take over the Kurdish town of Kobane, which
ended in defeat by a combination of Kurdish ground forces and American
air strikes on January 26, 2015, after months of heavy fighting. On the
other hand, al Qaeda initially had a superior capability to mount terrorist
attacks outside of Syria and Iraq as a jihadist version of deterrence, especially against Europeans and the U.S., although ISIS is working to improve
its capabilities in this area.
The greatest failure of both ISIS and al Qaeda in their efforts in Syria and
potentially in Iraq is the lack of unity among the various jihadist movements. The constant warfare among competing groups inevitably weakens
the effort in Syria. One could argue that ISIS and al Qaeda engage in a peri-
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odic war of attrition against one another, which is greatly to the advantage
of the Assad regime. Despite the ISIS group’s success with tribal groups,
success depends on the tribes seeing ISIS as a better bet than either Damascus or Baghdad. Over time, tribal groups could see ISIS as a bad choice,
but that would require more than ISIS blunders; it would require central
governments to change their policies and overcome deep-rooted animus
and lack of trust on the part of the tribes.
Finally, despite their minor successes, neither ISIS nor al Qaeda has been
able to win over or neutralize the Kurds in either Syria or Iraq. The net effect of this failure is that both jihadist groups have serious and able fighters
threatening their flanks. The Kurds are not enough to overcome ISIS, but
ISIS can never quite achieve its goals as long as determined, hostile Kurdish
Peshmerga forces threaten the consolidation of ISIS gains.

Al-Suri’s Call to Global Islamic Resistance Model
The weakness was not in the methods of the organizations or in the
organizations [themselves] in a general sense. On the contrary, it was the
changing times and the givens of the new reality after 1990 that made
these methods obsolete. I used a metaphor to clarify what I mean in some
of [my] lectures in Afghanistan and I will return to it here.
So, [imagine] you have an electric machine that is excellent, powerful
and outstanding! But it works only on an old electric system of 110 volts;
then, as happened in our countries, there is a complete changeover of
electric power providers to 220 volts.
Then, what happens if you were to insist on using it? The machine will be
consumed by fire; your electric system will be destroyed and perhaps you
will be electrocuted in the bargain! It goes without saying that the weakness is not with the machine itself, for it is flawless and perfect for its time,
but the surrounding new circumstances made it obsolete. Its natural place
became a museum in a corner of a vault as a relic from the past. And your
love of it, your beautiful memories with it, and the fact that it is a legacy
from your parents will not change the reality at all.27

Abu Mus’ab al-Suri used the metaphor above in his last major work, Call
to Global Islamic Resistance, less than a year before Pakistani authorities
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captured him in 2005. He intended this work to be his encyclopedic legacy
of jihadist history and doctrine for future jihadists to study. He had been a
jihadist for his entire adult life, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood insurrection in Syria until his sojourn with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, which ended in his flight from Afghanistan after the American overthrow of the Taliban government. He had written histories of the
major jihadist activities, including works on Syria, Algeria, Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Central Asia. He became convinced that a jihadist insurrection based in one country, such as Egypt or Algeria, could not
succeed after the U.S. emerged as the single global superpower after the fall
of the Soviet Union. A jihadist insurrection based on a regional approach
had a better chance; however, the only real hope for jihadists involved a
globally networked effort. Al-Suri had great respect for the power of the
modern U.S. military; he did not believe American forces, bolstered by
their system of global alliances, could be defeated by traditional clandestine
organizations anywhere.
For years, Al-Suri urged jihadists to think in terms of a system rather than
an organization. In his Call to Global Islamic Resistance, he described an
ideal model for such a system of jihad, which he recognized would need
to be adjusted to changing world conditions, just as the old single-country
clandestine organization had to be abandoned in the face of the Americanled coalition of modern allies. Al-Suri recommended a system in which
jihadists would unite under a global model with three components, which
he referred to as circles: (1) a clandestine central leadership circle; (2) a
coordination circle, which would be a collection of “open front” regional
jihadist insurrections; and (3) a “call” circle, composed of individual and
small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines. These enemy lines could be Europe, the U.S., or anywhere Muslims felt compelled to contribute to global
resistance to the modern world order as jihadists, their only allegiance to
the jihadist resistance.
The system that most resembles al-Suri’s model today is al Qaeda’s, led by
al-Suri’s old friend and leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. The central circle is
the clandestine al Qaeda Central, based in South Asia. The coordination
circle approximates al Qaeda’s system of affiliates and associated groups.
Finally, the call circle approximates the small cells and individual jihadists
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often referred to in the U.S. as lone-wolf terrorists. However, a “lone wolf ”
is not what al-Suri had in mind. In fact, his model was based on lone-wolf
jihadists, but he thought that such random acts had no political or systematic effect. His system was meant to coordinate the activities of small-cell
terrorists with the policies of the central circle. This coordination was to
be carried out by what we refer to as affiliates, al-Suri’s coordination circle.
For security reasons, the coordination circle would need to minimize
its contact with the isolated call cells. This contact at a maximum would
involve initial funding and training by what al-Suri called a builder cell. At
a minimum, the call cell would have no contact of any kind with the rest of
the circle and would fund itself and train itself using materials provided on
the Internet. One need only think of the role of al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) in providing inspirational and instructional materials
online for the Boston Marathon bombers in 2013 or, reportedly, initial
funding for the Paris conspirators who attacked the Charlie Hebdo magazine offices on January 7, 2015. We should expect, however, that in many
cells there would also be an initial facilitator who pushes individuals into
radicalization but is not personally an attacker, and may in fact commit no
acts that would allow criminal prosecution.
The other system that resembles al-Suri’s model is the ISIS group’s selfstyled caliphate. This has a semi-clandestine center surrounding the selfproclaimed khalifa (caliph); a series of provinces, similar to affiliates, in
Libya, Algeria, and the Sinai, for example; and growing indications of the
presence of lone-wolf terrorists in the U.S. and Europe. By using al-Suri’s
template as a guide to the basic requirements of a jihadist group, one can
see how ISIS distinguished itself from al Qaeda and previous groups.

Guerrilla Doctrine: Al-Suri’s Template and ISIS
The first building block of a jihadist organization is what al-Suri, like
other jihadists, calls a manhaj, which is a program, methodology, or guiding ideology around which the members convene. Al-Zawahiri has always
claimed that al Qaeda follows the manhaj al-nubuwah, or the prophetic
program, which attempts to return Islam to the seventh-century governance of the first followers of the Prophet Mohammad, which the al
Qaeda leader calls the “Rightly Guided Caliphate.” This is exactly the
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manhaj that ISIS claims to follow, but with a key difference: For al-Zawahiri, the caliphate was a goal located somewhere in the undefined future
and al Qaeda was considered an organization within the larger jihadist
movement; for al-Baghdadi, on the other hand, the caliphate exists now,
and he governs it as the Caliph Ibrahim.
Al-Baghdadi emphasizes the concept of community (jama’ah) and claims
that leadership embraces both the political and religious aspects of life. Al
Qaeda never claimed to be a religious organization; its leadership claimed
to combine political and military leadership in Osama bin Laden, and now
in Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the vanguard of the jihadist movement. One can
conclude, then, that although both groups use the same words for their
manhaj, ISIS claims to have achieved al Qaeda’s goal and therefore to have
supplanted al Qaeda as the leader—not just of the jihadist movement but
of all Muslims, a breathtaking leap. It is difficult to see how the two groups
can reunite without one of them abandoning its reason for existence.
The second building block is leadership, which includes a paramount
leader to whom its members pledge allegiance (bay’ah), as well as an advisory council, other councils such as military and religious councils, and an
administrative body. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have clearly identified structures that resemble this description, but again, ISIS has insisted that it has
the elements of a state with territory and governing departments such as a
consumer affairs council, an education council, and so on.
The third necessary building block is the strategic plan or roadmap that
allows a jihadist organization to meet its offensive and defensive goals. Al
Qaeda and ISIS share the general roadmap for creating an Islamic emirate,
written in 2004 by al Qaeda strategist Abu Bakr Naji. Naji does not provide a recipe for jihadist groups to follow; instead he emphasizes that he is
providing a strategic outline in broad strokes. Only a field commander can
devise a strategy for a particular area based on geographic, demographic,
and economic circumstances of the target area. His work, The Administration of Savagery, was used as a training manual for recruits, which is exactly
how ISIS uses it. (See “Guerrilla Strategy: The Administration of Savagery
as Operational Guide.”) This strategy is based on creating or taking advantage of areas in the countryside or a city that have fallen into chaos in order
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to drive out government troops and impose a proto-state, which Naji calls
the administration of savagery. In a large countryside such as Yemen or
remote areas in Syria and Iraq, a number of such liberated areas may be created, expanded, and consolidated. There may be specific strategic plans for
special circumstances as well.
ISIS devised a plan it called Khutah Istratijiyyah li Ta’ziz al-Mawqif alSiyasy li ‘l-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Iraq (Strategic Plan to Strengthen the
Political Position of the Islamic State in Iraq) in 2009/2010 after ISI had
been decimated by a combination of attacks by American troops and the
Iraqi tribal Awakening Councils (the Sahwah) during 2007-2008. Anticipating American troop withdrawals, it proposed to create alliances with
Sunni tribes, similar to the Sahwah groups supported by the Americans,
except this time to attack Shia communities in Iraq and central government forces and installations, which would be dominated by Shia factions.
Once ISIS established itself in Syria, it followed this basic plan there as
well. These well-conceived strategic approaches has given both al Qaeda
and ISIS a significant advantage over other groups in Syria. On balance,
ISIS has been more consistent than al Qaeda and has been able to keep the
strategic upper hand and usually, but not always, comes out the winner in
local tactical situations.
The fourth building block outlined by al-Suri is tamwil (funding). Al Qaeda
and the ISIS group’s funding sources are very similar, although ISIS has been
much more successful in self-funding. In the past, both groups have relied on
funding from oil-rich Gulf countries, not directly, but from wealthy patrons.
This funding has been replaced for the most part by criminal enterprises involving smuggling, human trafficking, robbing banks, and taking war booty.28
Perhaps because the ISIS group’s founder began his career as an enterprising
criminal while al Qaeda’s founder was a businessman of sorts, ISIS has always
had an advantage in funding from criminal enterprises like smuggling petroleum products. Since declaring itself to be the caliphate, ISIS has outstripped
al Qaeda and every other jihadist group in funding itself exclusively through
criminal enterprises, taxes, and fees in areas it controls.
According to the general consensus of the Western analytical community,
ISIS is the richest jihadist organization, with revenues of US$2 billion
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to $2.5 billion per year, according to one estimate, although its expenses
are much higher than that.29 We may well assume that ISIS prioritizes its
funding for operations and keeping tribal allies faithful, but it is also fair
to conclude that it desperately needs large revenue streams to continue to
operate at current levels.
As with al Qaeda, the U.S. government, working with its allies, has targeted
the ISIS group’s sources of revenue. For example, ISIS funds itself in part
through the sale of antiquities of all kinds.30 The U.S. Department of State
has a program to combat this source of funding, but it needs more support
and a higher profile. Similarly, tightening up enforcement on smuggling,
while extremely difficult, is not impossible and could have a significant
effect on ISIS revenues. The most lucrative target revenue stream for ISIS
in October 2014 was based on petroleum products. At that time, the U.S.
Treasury Department estimated that the group’s revenue from petroleum in
Syria and Iraq amounted to US$1 million to $2 million per day. By December 2014, however, the revenue had tapered off significantly because of U.S.
and coalition military activities.31 On February 3, 2015, the spokesman for
the Pentagon announced that “oil revenue is no longer the lead source of
[ISIS’s] income in dollars.” 32 U.S. officials have not specified the amount of
the cut, but if the international coalition could cut petroleum refining and
smuggling by ISIS only by half, we could see a drop in annual revenues to
ISIS on the order of US$15 million to $30 million per month.
These and other criminal activities are all known problems; efforts already
exist and programs are in place to address them. Prioritizing and resourcing
these programs across the spectrum of ISIS funding could pay large dividends. In addition, traditional counterinsurgency training and security assistance for local military and security elements in Iraq will continue to be
necessary to ensure that local forces can eventually replace coalition forces
in attacking revenue streams to ISIS.
The last of al-Suri’s building blocks for a clandestine jihadist organization is
the pledge of allegiance (bay’ah). Both organizations use the bay’ah to its leaders as an organizing principle. The bay’ah is an ancient Islamic ritual in which
an individual personally swears a religiously binding pledge of fealty and
obedience to a Muslim leader. In practice, this means that individuals become
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members of a jihadist group by pledging bay’ah to its leader, whom they are
now bound to obey. If this leader then pledges allegiance to the leader of
another group, all the pledged members of the original group are also bound
to follow the leader of the other group. This system of pledges of allegiance
produces a jihadist network with centralized guidance and decentralized execution, which became the hallmark of al Qaeda operations. The ISIS group’s
achievements on the battlefield and in propaganda has led to greater success
in acquiring such pledges of allegiance from individuals and groups in, for example, Egypt, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, al
Qaeda still has strong allies and is expanding in South Asia to include India.
Al-Suri argued that a jihadist enterprise must adapt to circumstances. ISIS
has demonstrated that it is a learning organization. Al-Suri also argued for
years that jihadists should work for a global system and not an organization
(tanzim). ISIS has stated that it is not a tanzim but a state. Whether it can
be as adaptable as a state with a population and territory to defend remains
to be seen. Destruction of the ISIS group’s so-called state in Syria and Iraq
likely also means destroying the carefully constructed ISIS system. On the
other hand, al Qaeda currently appears to be an adaptable system composed
of local organizations, any of which could be destroyed without destroying
the system as a whole.

Guerrilla Strategy: The Administration of Savagery
as Operational Guide
In his influential book, Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner (circa 2001),
Ayman al-Zawahiri demonstrates that knowledge of classic guerrilla warfare
as practiced by ISIS and al Qaeda existed within the Salafi jihadist movement as early as the 1970s in Egyptian circles.33 In 1974, nine years after the
publication of Robert Taber’s classic account of guerrilla warfare, a young
man named Yahya Hashim came to al-Zawahiri for advice and support.
Hashim was a deputy prosecutor who had turned against the Egyptian regime on religious principles and had converted to the “jihadist movement.”
He was especially concerned about the fate of some young officers who
were engaged in a revolt in the Military Technical College. Hashim had
become obsessed with the issue, following details of the case in great detail,
and beginning to consider armed confrontation with the Egyptian regime
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via guerrilla warfare. He raised this idea with al-Zawahiri, who wrote, “I did
not agree and told him that the nature of the country was not suitable for
this kind of warfare. Then I gave him a book about guerrilla warfare.”
The young man apparently did not learn from al-Zawahiri’s book. Gripped
with idea of starting a guerrilla war, he shared his plan with some of his
brothers. His idea was to get the officers out of jail and begin operations
in the mountains near the desert in Minya Governorate, on the west bank
of the Nile, about 150 miles south of Cairo. The plan was discovered, and
Hashim fled to the mountains with a number of military officers. The mayor of a nearby community became suspicious of the group and informed
security officials, who went after the would-be guerrillas in force. When
the rebel group ran out of ammunition, the security forces seized them and
Hashim was killed in the action. Al-Zawahiri praises him as a hero of the
jihadist movement against the government, but remarks that the conditions
favoring success for guerrilla warfare simply did not exist.
Like al Qaeda, ISIS is known to use Abu Bakr Naji’s The Administration of
Savagery to give new recruits the big picture about the strategy and tactics favored by the group they have just joined. Like al-Zawahiri, Naji is a
proponent of the Salafi jihadist movement and wrote his book as a universal guide to jihadist revolution and the creation of an Islamic emirate. Naji
presents the ideal conditions for jihad to define priority states and refers his
readers to studies performed by al-Suri. He uses the term “administration of
savagery” to refer to the goal of setting up proto-governments in liberated
areas, and gives five ideal conditions to establish these areas:
•	Geographic depth and topography favorable to guerrilla operations
•	Weak government unable to control peripheries or densely populated internal areas
•	The nature of the people; lack of social cohesion allowing polarization
•	Presence of a strong and expanding jihadist movement and preachers
•	Availability of weapons distributed among the people
It is clear that Nilotic Egypt is missing several of these characteristics. Most
of the country’s population is confined to a thin fertile strip along the Nile.
While political divisions are apparent, there still exists a high degree of social
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cohesion among the people and a strong identity as Egyptians. In post–Arab
Spring conditions, the area is awash with weapons, but the strong central
Egyptian government is able to uncover insurgent cells as they form. The Sinai, however, has much more favorable terrain for guerrillas and shows much
less social cohesion. But even here, the strong central government tends to
grind down the opposition, although it is hampered by lack of recent experience in counterinsurgency and a military still equipped and trained primarily for conventional warfare. The insurgency in the Sinai began as an al Qaeda
enterprise calling itself Ansar Bait al-Maqdis in 2011, which increased its
activity after the fall of the Morsi government in 2013. It gained much more
international prominence, however, after the group pledged allegiance to alBaghdadi and the insurgency was subsumed within ISIS as an Islamic State
province in the Sinai, sometimes referred to as Wilayat Sina.
Abu Bakr Naji’s book proposes a three-stage guerrilla strategy that mirrors the three-stage strategy found on al-Zawahiri’s hard disk in Kabul and
echoes the strategy proposed by the foremost strategists and practitioners
of the jihadist movement. Naji’s formulation is more colorful:
1. Damage and exhaustion;
2. “Administration of savagery” in liberated areas;
3. Creation of Islamic state by consolidating liberated areas.
ISIS deviated from this strategy by jumping ahead to declare itself the
caliphate for all Muslims instead of stopping at an Islamic emirate. This
declaration increased its ability to recruit significantly more members, but
also poses problems with other jihadist groups because ISIS did not seek a
consensus before moving to this end state.
When Mao Tse-tung proposed a strategy for guerrilla warfare, he felt compelled to justify using the word “strategy” to describe a tactic in warfare that
was traditionally a tool of a conventional army, following a conventional
strategy. Mao claimed, however, that when a territory is vast like China,
guerrilla warfare “knocks at the gates of strategy.” 34 In Mao’s terms, guerrilla warfare becomes strategic in the case of a vast but weak state, China,
fighting a small but powerful country, Japan, that occupies extended areas
in a protracted war. In the third decisive stage of Mao’s strategy, however,
conventional warfare returns and becomes primary.
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In the concept of jihadists like ISIS, the Muslim Umma is vast but weak
and is occupied by foreign powers or their client apostate states.35 The
three-stage strategy also requires conventional or at least semi-conventional
forces in the third stage of consolidating liberated areas. However, as ISIS
has implemented its war, the third stage may come when it “liberates” a
rural area or cities such as al-Raqqa in Syria or Mosul in Iraq, or even sections within cities. The three-stage strategy is then a constant as ISIS moves
from area to area, driving other forces out and whenever possible setting
up its primitive government within the surrounding sea of chaos. Having
no heavy industry of its own, it arms its semi-conventional forces from the
arms left abandoned by its opponent.
ISIS uses guerrilla tactics throughout its campaign in Syria and Iraq. It
attacks weak, isolated units for the most part and avoids stronger forces.
When it attacks an isolated army installation or other fortified area, it often
succeeds by using suicide bombers in the initial assault. In video after video,
ISIS shows a smiling jihadist making a short speech in a large truck filled
with explosives; and then, sometimes using aerial photography, ISIS shows
the progress of the truck against a target until it explodes. Later, it films
guerrillas in small units moving through the installation or town mopping
up local forces. It avoids attrition of its own forces except when it believes it
can prevail in a high-value target such as Kobane. In areas such as Baghdad,
ISIS uses terrorist attacks to keep its enemy occupied, in hopes of exhausting and demoralizing their forces.
Mosul and al-Raqqa have become new safe havens and symbols of success.
In both areas, but especially in Mosul, one can see the effects of criminal
networks that apparently existed during al-Zarqawi’s time, when his cadres
extorted money and in some cases acted as contract killers. ISIS today
advertises its execution of freelance robbers and drug dealers as evidence
of its intent to protect the people and provide security, the bare minimum
requirement to set up Naji’s administration of savagery.
As ISIS has consolidated its hold on cities and villages, it has used tribal
alliances and former Baathist military to provide local governance and act,
in Clausewitz’s term levée en masse, as an armed populace to oppose any
encroachment by outside conventional forces or militias. Naji had advised
jihadists with urban backgrounds to study tribal customs in sociological
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studies to allow them to deal effectively with tribes; and he had anticipated
that some members of the central government could be persuaded to join
the jihadist cause, much as the former military and political cadres of Saddam Hussein’s government did after the U.S. invasion.
Naji had another important message: that ordinary Muslim people could not
be relied on and were reluctant to join a jihadist operation because they were
more concerned about their daily affairs or had been co-opted by the central
government. He argued that jihadists needed to use polarization to mobilize
a Muslim population. In his concept, one could polarize a community by using money to gain support, especially with tribes. ISIS has certainly used this
tactic. But the main means of polarization in Syria and Iraq, where al-Zarqawi
made great use of it, is the Sunni-Shia divide and sectarian warfare. In other
areas such as the Sinai or Libya where this sectarian division does not apply,
ISIS, and al Qaeda before it, uses other polarizing issues such as factional
disputes in Libya or resentment of Sinai’s traditional residents against the
government in Nilotic Egypt. Without polarization in an area, the ISIS
group’s strategy would falter. The use of terrorism and videos of violence
against enemies are powerful tools in its polarizing campaigns.
The U.S. and the coalition of nations against ISIS have the traditional military and political tools to weaken the group by understanding its strategy
and tactics in detail and devising means to counter them. The most difficult
issue to address, however, is polarization. The U.S. has taken the first major
step to address polarization in Iraq by pressing for a more inclusive government, but Syria is still elusive. If progress in Iraq is slow and uncertain, in Syria
it has not even begun. The air campaign is an extremely powerful (but not
sufficient) military tool and can demonstrate that ISIS is less powerful than
its propaganda would have us believe. However, addressing polarization can
only occur in the context of a political solution that has not been described
in great enough detail for Iraq and has not been articulated at all in Syria.
The convincing description of political goals needs to accompany anticipated
military success to avoid having any such success becoming temporary.
The importance for ISIS of The Administration of Savagery, and the reason
that this group still uses it in training new recruits and as a guide for regional commanders, may be because the book distills the essence of jihadist
strategic thinking on insurgency up until its completion in late 2004.36 Its
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lessons are cast as universal truths based on what the author calls “universal
laws” of war and politics. These laws naturally describe guerrilla doctrine
and tactics that were as true for al Qaeda as they were for Mao, in the author’s view. The book also represents bin Laden’s and al-Zawahiri’s view that
the United States can be driven out of the Middle East because it acts on
self-interest, not principle. According to this view, if jihadists could demonstrate that the cost of staying in the region is too high in blood and treasure,
the U.S. would leave the greater Middle East, and modern jihadists could
then create a new empire using modern military tactics and an ancient plan
of government.
Part of the cost of staying could be addressed by guerrilla strategy, terrorism
tactics, and brutality, which ISIS has always emphasized. Another aspect,
according to Naji, is that seizing energy resources in the Middle East and
North Africa would give jihadists the economic power to create the caliphate and cripple Western economies, especially the American system. Al
Qaeda consistently failed to seize energy assets in the Arabian Peninsula;
however, ISIS has made seizing oilfields a priority in Syria and Iraq and has
succeeded to the extent that it strengthened its finances beyond any other
jihadist group. Its threat to Saudi Arabia is in part to carry out bin Laden’s
and al-Zawahiri’s greater plan.

Discussion Questions
1.	The untitled paper found in al-Zawahiri’s laptop—most likely alSuri’s work—describes three stages of guerrilla warfare. What steps
could a government take to keep the first stage of guerrilla warfare
(attrition through hit-and-run tactics used by the guerrillas) from devolving into the second stage (equilibrium between the mujahedeen
and government forces)?
2.	Al-Suri’s jihadist global model has three components: (1) a clandestine central leadership circle; (2) a coordination circle of regional
jihadist insurrections; and (3) a “call” circle of individual and smallcell terrorism behind enemy lines. In what ways do al Qaeda and the
Islamic State follow this model? In what ways do they diverge from
this model?
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3.	Develop a counterstrategy to attack the three key components of alSuri’s model outlined above.
4.	How important is the role of politics for a government facing guerrilla warfare? What kind of political messages have worked in the past?
What differences, if any, should there be between political messaging
during a conflict with jihadists versus political messaging against a
more familiar left-wing insurgency?
5.	Setting the differences in their ideologies aside, how would you compare the ISIS group’s conduct of war with Mao’s wars against Japan
and Nationalist Chinese forces, or any other left-wing insurrection
with which you are familiar?
6.	Using al-Suri’s analytical template for clandestine jihadist organizations, do you think that ISIS or al Qaeda will pose a greater threat to
U.S. interests in the long run?
7.	With al-Suri’s template in mind, how would you recommend the U.S.
government decrease the likelihood of a strategic alliance between al
Qaeda elements in Syria and ISIS at some point in the future?
8.	The U.S. government devised a sophisticated network to attack
funding sources for al Qaeda. What steps would you recommend to
reduce funding for ISIS?
9.	Is ISIS more like a clandestine organization or more like a state? Explain.
10.	Al-Suri’s definition of the ideal conditions for jihadists seems to
describe conditions in both Syria and Iraq at the present time. How
could the U.S. government devise a cost-effective strategy and tactics
to weaken the conditions that help jihadists?
11.	The jihadists’ strategy is to increase the costs, in terms of both blood
and treasure, of the U.S. presence in the region, thereby forcing Americans to leave the greater Middle East and allowing jihadists to fill the
political vacuum. In what ways can the U.S. attack this strategy?
12.	How does the ISIS group’s use of brutality and terrorism line up with
other insurgencies with which you are familiar? Does the level of brutality matter to the outcome ISIS seeks?
13.	What steps might the U.S. take (without occupying territory) to help
diminish sectarian polarization in Syria and Iraq?
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CHAPTER
THREE

ISIS Group’s Successful Mobilization Tactics
A crucial part of the success of ISIS in Iraq and Syria is the group’s ability
to continuously refresh its ranks of fighters despite heavy losses against
other jihadist groups, the Kurds, the U.S.-led coalition air campaign, and
regional governments. Recruiting foreign fighters to augment the ranks
of local recruits is a key element of ISIS mobilization. By February 2015,
U.S. officials estimated that as many as 20,000 recruits from perhaps 90
countries had joined the group.37 The total ISIS fighting force from all
sources in Syria and Iraq has been estimated to be as low as 30,000 and
as high as 100,000. The estimate for all security forces, including police,
could be as high as 200,000.38
The ISIS mobilization success so far has been based on its ability to use
social media adroitly, but behind this success is a carefully constructed narrative of a foundational myth, the promise of apocalyptic victory against all
enemies in the long run, and the myth of a welcoming home for all Muslim
recruits in the immediate term. Before attempting to construct a counter
narrative, we must first understand its content. The ISIS group’s magazine Dabiq reliably reflects the group’s policy and propaganda and is also
one of the most accessible vehicles for its messages. Examining ISIS media
content, especially Dabiq, reveals its key messages and its potential target
audiences, the “what” of its mobilization effort.
In addition, selected Social Movement Theory concepts, best known for
use in analyzing political movements in Western societies, provide analysts
with tools to understand “how” ISIS mobilizes support for its political and
military program.

Communication Strategy
The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—
by Allah’s permission—until it burns the crusader Armies in Dabiq.
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ISIS has attributed this inspirational saying to its founder Abu Mus’ab
al-Zarqawi, and it appears in every issue of the magazine Dabiq. Dabiq’s
first issue explains that its name comes from the place name of an area in
the northern countryside of Aleppo, which was mentioned in a hadith (a
reported saying of the Prophet Muhammad): “The [last] Hour will not
be established until the Romans land at al-A’maq or Dabiq. Then an army
from al-Madinah of the best people on the earth at that time will leave
for them.” Dabiq continues the hadith as it describes an epic battle called
“Malahim” in Arabic and “Armageddon” in English. The battle will be
between the Muslim forces led by the Mahdi, but it will not occur until the
Prophet Isa ( Jesus) descends on Damascus to confront a demonic “deceiver” who is leading the people astray. His appearance signals the beginning
of the end times, which open with an epic battle in which Muslims triumph
over Christian forces and culminate in the glorious end times, which represent not necessarily an end but the beginning of an indefinite period during
which the entire world will be Muslim.39
This story used by ISIS is very old and is at the heart of popular Muslim
Apocalyptic tradition. Scholars sometimes refer to this tradition as the
A’maq cycle,40 after a series of valleys in northern Syria. Dabiq is now a small
town of approximately 3,000 people, but some believe it will be the scene
of the ultimate confrontation between Muslims and Christians before the
last Hour. This imaginative setting is romantic and open to interpretation.
Numerous books have been written about the signs of the end times and
are best sellers in some parts of the Middle East.
ISIS has chosen a tradition that may be found in one of the major collections of hadiths, the Sahih Muslim.41 Like all sibylline utterances, its
interpretation is malleable and may fit a variety of circumstances. For
example, Western troops landing in Syria would allow ISIS to call for jihad
based on a hadith that anyone with access to the Internet or Islamic books
could find. The hadith’s interpretation connects the lands stretching from
the city of Medina in Saudi Arabia in the south, through Iraq and Syria, to
the borders of Turkey in the north. Other traditions connect this area in
imagination to the black banners of Khorasan and the founder of ISIS, Abu
Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, who came from Afghanistan (Khorasan) through Iran
to Iraq, to found a proto-state that would stretch from to Iraq to Syria. To
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a new convert to Islam, these founding myths may be embellished to give
a romantic purpose and meaning to a life full of struggles, which like all
romantic quests, is full of suffering before the goal is reached.
Al-Suri in his Call to Global Islamic Resistance cemented this romantic
quest to the jihadist tradition side by side with his military theories
of jihad, devoting the end of his long book to a catalog and analysis of
apocalyptic hadiths.42 While some of these dealt with the black banner of
Khorasan and the army of jihadists led by the Mahdi flooding out of the
east to conquer all before them before taking Jerusalem, and were featured in some of al Qaeda’s recruitment efforts, the apocalyptic tradition
was never in the forefront for Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.
Now, however, ISIS is embracing it in a powerful message to its potential
recruits wherever they are.

ISIS and the Apocalypse
If the apocalyptic material is ancient, the ISIS group’s method of delivering it is thoroughly modern and shaped to make the message suit the
group’s policies and recruitment efforts. ISIS has excelled in videos and
glossy magazines with high production values, including professional
editing of videos and high-resolution cameras for still shots. If the message is 80 percent of the struggle, it should not be surprising that ISIS
takes great care in coordinating its messages and overlapping methods
of delivery. The use of social media ensures that target audiences will be
reached by a method that suits their circumstances. If a target population
does not have ready access to computers, content targeted at smartphones
offers an alternative. Where Facebook is popular, that is the chosen platform for messaging. If the smartphone is the preferred device, as it is with
younger audiences, especially for recruitment, Twitter and even personal
messaging are the delivery of choice. In short, all methods of delivery are
available for general propaganda.
For example, the announcement of the “return” of the caliphate was handled in very carefully orchestrated fashion, including multiple languages
and all available electronic forums. Online, one could read the announcement of the caliphate and its new caliph delivered by the ISIS spokesman;
and then on popular commercial video platforms, one could watch a video
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of the inaugural speech by the new self-styled caliph in the historic mosque
in Mosul. A few days later, the first issue of Dabiq began appearing on
selected websites, and it included quotes from the new caliph about various
policies that first appeared on Twitter. Generally, commercial enterprises
like Twitter and YouTube will remove such postings for violating content
policies, but once posted they take on a life of their own on the Internet
and can be found on a variety of public and private websites and blogs.

ISIS Messaging
ISIS messaging may be lurid and overwhelming, as in the beheading videos,
or it may be subtle and intended for specific audiences. For example, the
first issue of Dabiq devoted an article to establishing that leadership means
both religious and political leadership for ISIS. The article’s title, “The
Concept of Imamah (Leadership) Is From the Millah (Path) of Ibrahim”
contains some allusions that resemble “dog whistles,” or phrases with special
significance to specific audiences (just as dog whistles are pitched outside
the range of human hearing, where only dogs can hear them—and be
trained to respond to them). For example, the statement that leadership is
derived from the path or way of Ibrahim (Arabic for the Prophet Abraham)
could simply mean that leadership derives from a Salafi jihadist concept
of Islam, because that is what “Millah Ibrahim” means to jihadists. On the
other hand, the path of Ibrahim could also allude to the other significant
event announced in the magazine: the seizure of religious and political
power by the new Caliph Ibrahim.
The embedded dog whistle is more obscure; Millah Ibrahim is the title
of an important book by Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a famous jihadist
religious authority and former mentor of al-Zarqawi. Al-Maqdisi turned
against al-Zarqawi because of the latter’s excessive and brutal violence and
became an outspoken critic of ISIS. Citing this book is signaling to other
jihadists, especially in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, that ISIS is claiming to
have accomplished what al-Maqdisi had only spoken about. Furthermore,
Dabiq’s apocalyptic messaging context would appeal to extremists in Saudi
Arabia, who admire al-Maqdisi’s works, tend toward a millenarian concept
of history, and agree with his harsh criticism of the Saudi government.
Dabiq contains other important indications of the ISIS group’s policies. For
example, in describing the strategy of founder al-Zarqawi, the authors of

isis: the terrorist group that would be a state

45

Dabiq introduce the transliterated Arabic words nikayah (damage/terrorism), tawahhush (savagery or chaos), and tamkin (establishing the protostate). These are ordinary words but are used as terms of art as the three stages
of jihad in The Administration of Savagery. The magazine also describes deals
with tribal councils, part of a strategy developed by ISIS in its written plan
for a comeback in Iraq in anticipation of the withdrawal of American forces,
and mimics the American approach to Awakening Councils among the tribes
in Iraq to decimate al Qaeda in Iraq. In the context of this strategy attributed
to al-Zarqawi, ISIS outlines a five-stage roadmap it will follow to expand its
proto-state. The first two stages constitute the recruitment and absorption of
individuals or groups into the ISIS structure, while the last three stages echo
the three-stage cycle of guerrilla warfare described by Naji and al-Suri.43
The first stage is the call for recruits to travel (hijrah) to ISIS-held areas in
Syria/Iraq or other battlefields. The second stage is to join (jama’ah) the group
and be trained and absorbed. The third stage is to engage in destabilizing the
central government with terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The fourth stage is
the establishment of the proto-state after government forces are withdrawn or
defeated—“the administration of savagery.” The final stage is the establishment
of an Islamic emirate or, in the case of Syria/Iraq, the self-declared caliphate.
This sequence makes sense only if one considers that the expansion of
the caliphate requires additional local and foreign recruits to be guided
through the five-stage path. In Syria and Iraq, the process is mature and
ISIS is fighting to survive, but in Egypt or Libya, to cite two active examples, the groups pledging allegiance to Caliph Ibrahim are in the beginning stages of the process. Anywhere ISIS exists, the stream of recruits is
required to replenish its losses in its continuous armed struggle to establish
its rule over new areas, consolidate those areas with previous conquests, and
then continue to expand. Essentially unopposed, ISIS forces expanded rapidly in northern Iraq, subduing village after village and setting up a primitive government under its own version of Islamic law. In Syria, however,
ISIS was able to consolidate its rule in al-Raqqa and increase government
services to the point where it can claim to have a number of government
services one would expect in a city. The most dramatic consolidation of
power was between contiguous areas in Iraq and Syria after Mosul fell to
ISIS forces when central government forces fled. The areas under ISIS con-
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trol, however, are not static. The greatest challenge for ISIS so far has been
Kurdish forces in both Syria and Iraq supported by U.S. air assets, which
have managed to defeat ISIS forces and drive it out of a number of previously occupied areas. Without a strong propaganda campaign to replenish
its ranks, ISIS could not sustain its momentum or continue to hold areas it
has taken by force.
Space does not permit cataloging all the allusions and messages in the first
issue of Dabiq, let alone all the messages in the following issues. Each page
is carefully written and dense with messages framed for a variety of audiences that ISIS intends to reach, both friends and enemies. Even a casual
reading of Dabiq demonstrates what one would expect from any jihadist
group, that is, the holy places in Saudi Arabia and Jerusalem are high mission priorities. A careful reading shows that, like al Qaeda, the ISIS group’s
doctrine follows in the Egyptian revolutionary intellectual tradition of
Sayyid Qutb and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. This tradition places the
modern concept of jihad as an individual obligation at the center of Islamic
doctrine; considers all Muslims except for Salafi jihadists to be apostate;
and downgrades Jews and Christians to the status of implacable enemies
that are not part of the Abrahamic tradition.

Mobilization: Social Movement Theory Concepts
Applied to ISIS
Several concept pairs developed in Social Movement Theory complement
the contextual analysis of ISIS’s general propaganda and its targeted usage of
social media for recruitment. These concepts are useful tools in assessing an
organization’s approach to mobilizing political forces behind its programs
and provide the frameworks for questions concerning how an organization is
successful in terms of its strengths and vulnerabilities. The first pair is culture
and framing, in which organizations frame all issues in terms of the culture of
the group it intends to influence. Framing can also be used to convert target
populations to a political culture mobilized for action. Over time, how an
organization frames issues becomes the political brand of that organization.
The second concept pair is violence and contention. The interplay of violence and contention44 in the political realm defines how and when violence
becomes the chosen form of political contention. The last concept pair to be
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considered is network and alliances. Here, the key is the distinction between
the two and the identification of when collaboration within a network is permitted under revolutionary Salafi jihadism, when an alliance is not permitted.

Culture and Framing
Perhaps the strongest aspect of the ISIS group’s mobilization strategy is its
ability to frame its messages consistently and with cross-references across
multiple social media platforms. However, as Quintan Wiktorowicz argues
in his groundbreaking book Islamic Activism, “One of the most critical
dimensions of the framing process for movement mobilization is frame
resonance.” 45 Like other Islamist recruiting efforts, ISIS frames messages
with different cultural resonance for different audiences. And like other extremist groups before it, ISIS recruiters target individuals and groups with
tailored appeals: purely political appeals, appeals to victimhood, religious
appeals, appeals that offer a new identity, and apocalyptic appeals. The
major overarching frames include the following:
• Salafi jihadist answer to world problems (true Islam)
• Fulfillment of end-times prophesies (apocalyptic adventure)
•	Answer to unjust U.S. and its client tyrants (caliphate as powerful
winner)
• Benign community of believers (paradise for lost millennials)
•	Avenger of racial and ethnic humiliation (revenge and rebirth for
victims)
• Best bet to survive (protector in war theaters)
ISIS framing exercises will change with changing events. The vocabulary
and symbols will vary with audience. These appeals may be single source or
mixtures such as Dabiq offers. What is new and a distinctive competitive
advantage for ISIS is its ability to match the medium to the preferences of
the target audience—in other words, it chooses the medium and message
that resonates best with the target audience. In the case of recruitment, the
framing may begin with a general framing on radical websites and Facebook
using themes such as the alleged victimization of Muslims in wars the U.S. or
its allies have fought. A general appeal using the usual framing of events in
Iraq, Syria, or other areas with a majority Muslim population may be part of a
broad radicalization effort. The appeal may be sharpened by Twitter offerings
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in English that target a young audience in a specific country. Finally, if individuals self-identify with specific concerns, ISIS operatives may target them
with personal messages to their phones or email accounts to continue the
radicalization process. These might be totally political in nature or may have
a religious cast. Where conditions permit, recruiters may offer these messages
in person in a way that may be protected by laws allowing freedom of speech.
If the message is religious, the target will be someone who may identify as a
Muslim but does not know much about Islam beyond clichés.
The distinctive framing used by ISIS, which is different from all other radical
groups currently, is its self-identification as the caliphate for all Muslims. One
of its most powerful appeals to lost souls is its representation of its Syrian
capital, al-Raqqa, as a peaceful community of believers where every race and
ethnicity is treated with respect and given a purpose in a loving community
of believers. This image remains powerful despite al-Raqqa’s grim reality.

Violence and Contention
So until we return to the correct state of Islamic affairs, it’s upon us all to
work together to eradicate the principle of “free choice,” and to not deceive
the people in an attempt to seek their pleasure, neither by calling to “free
choice” directly, nor by alluding to it indirectly. Rather, we must confront
them with the fact that they’ve turned away from the religion, while we
hold onto it, grasping its purity, its clarity, its comprehensiveness, without
any blemishes due to shirk [idolatry], misguidance or heresy, and that we’re
completely ready to stand in the face of anyone who attempts to divert us
from our commitment to making the religion of Allah triumphant over all
other religions, and that we will continue to fight the people of deviation
and misguidance until we die trying to make the religion triumphant.46

In most political movements, the key question is how political contention
is managed. The usual assumption is that denying any political space for
opposition creates the conditions in which political violence is more likely.
Furthermore, indiscriminate suppression of dissent is generally viewed as
a mobilizing force for those who would engage in revolutionary activities. Some clandestine organizations in the Middle East and North Africa,
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, inhabit a space that allows the pragmatic
choice of violence or nonviolence depending on the circumstances. It is
misleading to assert, however, that any Islamist group is inherently nonvio-
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lent. While Salafi jihadists are at the extreme of Islamist identity, there is
no Gandhi or Martin Luther King, Jr. in Islamist ranks. Jihadists argue that
violence is always necessary in dealing with political foes. Occasionally, a
Salafi jihadist will argue that violence must be avoided to prevent damage
or destruction to the jihadist movement as a whole or in a particular country. In general, however, those making such statements generally make them
in jail or after being released. The question for Salafi jihadists is not whether
they will resort to violence—but against whom, when, and how.
The quote above indicates an answer to the first two questions. ISIS is
a modern totalitarian political movement based on a deviant Islamic
analysis. It is a radical form of takfir (declaring someone to be an infidel)
that is applied to all except those who accept the new caliphate. Therefore, violence is directed against anyone or any group that disagrees with
the group’s ideology. Similarly, the timing of violence against those who
disagree is always until all dissent is crushed. It is an eternal war until the
end times. The first ones who must be killed or converted are those who
say they are Muslims but reject the truth that ISIS claims to be bringing
to the world. The “Flood” alluded to in the theme of issue 2 of Dabiq is
the great Flood that destroyed the entire world except for the Prophet
Noah (called Nuh in Islam).
The ISIS group’s practice of killing civilians and captive soldiers seems
arbitrary and barbaric when viewed from the outside. Such violence is
correctly recognized as primarily a terror tool and a recruiting vehicle. By
killing those who resist, ISIS intends to encourage others to submit, an
ancient practice that has precedents in Alexander the Great’s conquests,
Caesar’s wars, and the Mongol invasion of the Middle East. However,
when ISIS kills soldiers after they surrender or kills noncombatants,
they discriminate between Sunnis, who are given a chance to repent and
pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi, and Shia, who are executed. Shia are
always framed as “rejectionists,” while Sunni are “apostates.” ISIS thus
denies that it kills indiscriminately.
Many question whether ISIS is more violent than al Qaeda or a greater
threat to the U.S. In fact, most signature atrocities such as videos recording
ritualized beheadings belong as much to al Qaeda’s repertoire as to ISIS. Al
Qaeda has beheaded Western civilians on camera clandestinely in Pakistan
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and Saudi Arabia, to cite two examples. The leadership of al Qaeda thought
these worked against its brand, but it is still possible to find video beheadings
claiming to be by al Qaeda’s Jabhat Nusra in Syria today. Al Qaeda also has
used suicide bombers against civilians in a number of countries. Certainly, al
Qaeda, like ISIS, has been responsible for the deaths of more Muslims than
non-Muslims in their numerous terror campaigns throughout the world.
The more interesting comparison is between ISIS and the Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) in Algeria during the 1990s. GIA developed into one of
the most radical and violent jihadist groups in modern times, although its
scope was local rather than transnational or global. In escalating waves of
violence marked by the massacre of civilians, GIA eventually claimed that
essentially all Algerians, except for their own members, were infidels meriting death. Even al Qaeda strategists al-Suri and Naji referred to the GIA
as “deviant.” Professor Mohammad M. Hafez has argued that GIA’s anticivilian violence in Algeria was “the outcome of an ill-fated convergence
of three variables—indiscriminate repression, exclusive organization, and
antisystem ideologies.” 47 Hafez argued that the Algerian government, after
a military coup that thwarted the legal election of an Islamist government
and the defeat of the founding secular regime, resorted to indiscriminate
violence to repress the protesting Islamist factions. This in turn allowed
GIA, which was a marginal but highly exclusive and secretive group, to
increase its membership, powered by powerful anti-government framing.
GIA eventually lost the support of a terrified populace and fell to the militarized government. It was this example that al-Zawahiri had in mind when
he counseled al-Zarqawi against anti-Shia violence and why al Qaeda today
is taking a stand against video beheadings. But GIA did not have the ISIS
group’s powerful media tools.48
In the face of other jihadist opposition, ISIS has turned video beheadings
and even live burnings to its advantage, at least in the short term. What
most people see as barbaric, a subset of radicalized individuals sees as heroic
acts of revenge and a sign of power against arrogant enemies. This shortterm strength, however, may turn into a long-term vulnerability—but only
if the U.S. and its allies can mount an effective counter narrative that rivals
the effectiveness of ISIS propaganda. Otherwise, culturally framed violence
will continue to be a significant tool in the ISIS arsenal.
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Networks and Alliances
The Islamic State has an extensive history of building relations with the tribes
within its borders in an effort to strengthen the ranks of the Muslims, unite
them under one imam, and work together towards the establishment of the prophetic Khilafah. Its practice of attending tribal forums, addressing the concerns
of the tribal leaders, and accepting their bay’ah is regularly met with success:
Last month, following instructions from the head of Public Relations in
Wilayat Halab [Governorate of Aleppo], the wilayah’s head of Tribal Af49
fairs attended a meeting with the following tribal representatives . . .

Clandestine groups, especially jihadist ones, operate within a shadow
network that includes not only allies but also other groups that collaborate because of specific mutual advantage. When at its weakest point
in 2009/2010 in Iraq, ISIS forged a strategy to strengthen its political
position, at the core of that strategy was the recognition that the group’s
treatment of Sunni tribes had created the circumstances in which the
tribal leaders were ready to ally with the U.S. to destroy AQI. Winning
over the Sunni tribes in Iraq was a large part of the ISIS reemergence in
Iraq. Similarly, in Syria, gaining the cooperation of tribal groups is at the
strategic core of the ISIS group’s tactical success.50
In the above quote, ISIS demonstrates how it succeeds with tribes by using a
Syrian example, but the same scenario played itself out in Iraq as well. After
the withdrawal of American forces, the Maliki government’s mistreatment of
the Sunni tribes created a universal hostility among their ranks. ISIS needed
to transform resentment, which could be passive, into active resistance. ISIS
went about this transformation by both using political arguments and providing tangible rewards. The tangible rewards were delivered in the context of
their proto-government, which is the equivalent of Naji’s Administration of
Savagery in areas from which central government forces had been withdrawn
in Iraq and Syria. These tangible benefits are succinctly described in Dabiq:
•
•
•
•
•

Returning property to owners
Investing millions of dollars in local services
Providing security and stability
Ensuring the availability of food and commodities in local markets
Reducing crime rate
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ISIS also reported what it expected from the tribes around Aleppo in
return. It requested that tribal elders collect the religious tax (zakat) and
prepare lists of orphans and widows who would benefit from the tax. Next,
it asked the elders to “encourage” youth to join its military forces and turn
in any weapon acquired either from the Assad regime or the Free Syrian
Army. Finally, ISIS told the elders that any of its members who had borne
arms against ISIS could repent; ominously, their repentance must occur
before ISIS captured them.
Recounting the meeting in Syria and other meetings, ISIS listed the names
of those tribes attending. However, Dabiq becomes vague when recounting
the number of tribal leaders that pledged allegiance to al-Baghdadi and ISIS.
The clear implication is that ISIS is accepting tribes’ buying into the ISIS
network and collaborating without actually becoming part of it. One could
say that the relationship is more than a network but less than an alliance,
especially since ISIS has substituted wilayat (governorates or provinces) for
allies. Naji wrote about “faith-based bonds of loyalty” as a substitute for tribal
loyalty, which he envied.51 This may be the model for ISIS seeking pledges
of allegiance or bay’ah as a substitute for tribal bonds. In following this path,
however, ISIS is vulnerable to tribal backlash and ultimately revolt under the
same conditions that would allow such a course.
We have discussed how ISIS relies on criminal networks and in many ways itself constitutes a criminal network of smugglers and extortionists. In addition
to using criminal networks logistically, ISIS appears to contract out killing.
For example, on one occasion when Kurdish forces in Iraq allowed reporters to interview captured ISIS killers, it became clear that the men were paid
killers, not ISIS soldiers. The men referred to ISIS in the third person, using
the pejorative term Dae’sh52 casually, as though it were the most ordinary way
to refer to the group, although use of that term would be avoided by any ISIS
member, even under duress. ISIS also networks with other hostile jihadist
organizations with which it is in a state of perpetual war. Such networking is
based on pragmatism and is the field commander’s prerogative. When al Qaeda groups in Syria occasionally collaborate with local ISIS forces in military
operations, such collaboration does not signify that the two parent groups are
considering reuniting. Unless the official spokesman announces a rapproche-
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ment or truce, any local accommodations should be considered normal
pragmatic field decisions without wider political ramifications.
To counter the ISIS group’s mobilization strategy requires collaboration
between Muslim-majority countries and the U.S. and its Western allies.
ISIS has shown its resilience as a social movement and a revolutionary
concept, so the collaboration against it must be long term. The U.S. cannot
effectively counter the specifically religious aspects of the ISIS narrative
because only Muslim authorities have any credibility in that arena. That
is not to say that the U.S. government should not collaborate with private
Muslim-American organizations, especially in anti-radicalization programs
in Muslim communities. However, addressing issues such as the end-times
narrative requires a deep knowledge of Islamic texts and traditions. Funding translations from Arabic is one important aspect of this struggle. While
Western public figures often state that Middle Eastern Muslims must do
more to counter radical statements, many Arabic voices are in fact raised
but go unnoticed because of language barriers. The West should at least
match the ISIS group’s translation efforts into major European languages.
Otherwise, the ISIS narrative goes unchallenged in, for example, English-,
French-, and German-speaking countries.
Much of what the U.S. can do involves avoiding playing into the mobilization narrative and inadvertently feeding it. The most famous example is
President George W. Bush’s use of “crusade” to describe American military
actions. To avoid such gaffes, a great deal more effort needs to be placed
on understanding the jihadist ideology. Much progress has been made, but
much more effort is required.
The importance of criminal networks to ISIS and al Qaeda argues for
vigorous cooperation among coalition law enforcement agencies to disrupt
these networks. Attacking crime in general will not help because the category is too broad, but putting organizations and individuals on notice that
the international community will give high priority to arresting and prosecuting individuals who receive goods smuggled by ISIS operatives would
be a significant positive step.
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Discussion Questions
1. Much of the ISIS group’s political propaganda involves the use of
Islamic symbols and popular beliefs. How can the U.S. and its coalition
allies counter this propaganda (for example, the use of the concept of
the Apocalypse) without making matters worse? What would be the
effect of ignoring this part of ISIS propaganda?
2. How important are Kurdish forces in the battle against ISIS in Iraq
and Syria? Should the U.S. arm the Kurds directly, even if the governments of Iraq and Turkey object? In other words, how would you make
the tradeoff between military gains against ISIS versus political complications with allies?
3. What elements would you include in an information war against ISIS?
4. ISIS uses “culture and framing” in much of its public dialogue via
terms and arguments that resonate with the culture of its target audiences to criticize its enemies, including the United States. How could
the U.S. frame ISIS attacks on historical and religious landmarks that
are much loved by local populations in ways that would resonate in the
greater Middle East? What would be the military’s role, if any, in this
messaging? Can you think of other issues that would be more effective
to reframe?
5. What factors contribute to the success of ISIS on social media? What
countermeasures are available to mitigate that success?
6. ISIS uses networks of Sunni Arab tribes in Syria and Iraq to prosecute
its war against the region. Much of its work with tribes was inspired
by the successful U.S. strategy against al Qaeda insurgents during the
“Surge” in Iraq. From your experience, could the U.S. replicate its work
with Sunni tribes in present-day Iraq and Syria without a large military
footprint? Explain.
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CHAPTER
FOUR

Conclusion: Net Assessment of ISIS Strengths and
Weaknesses With Recommendations
As suggested earlier, this case study is intended to be a preliminary net assessment of the ISIS group’s strengths and weaknesses. To be useful, such a
net assessment must take into account a relatively long time frame, which
current trends suggest. What follows are conclusions gained from this assessment, with preliminary recommendations based on current research.

The Enemy’s Strengths
One of the greatest failures of the U.S. approach to ISIS mirrors a shortcoming with al Qaeda—namely, a failure to identify precisely who the enemy is and describe it in the terms it describes itself. This failure of concept
stems from an attitude that is often heard in private conversation but not
written down. Too often, analysis of ISIS and al Qaeda fails to recognize
the importance of the written word to these groups. Both ISIS and al
Qaeda are modern, adaptive learning organizations in spite of the primitive
society they espouse, and their strategists and practitioners take great care
in the written and spoken word. They produce written primers for recruits
in grand strategy as well as strategic critiques of their own operations.
ISIS follows in al Qaeda’s footsteps by having multifaceted strategies based
on lessons learned from past failures and successes. We know that ISIS’s
military strategy begins from a model that would be recognized by Mao,
Che Guevara, or General Giap. It is a strategy that hopes to defeat the most
powerful global military by using a political strategy aimed at convincing
the U.S. that staying the course in the Middle East will be too costly in lives,
treasure, and international prestige. And it intends to defeat local powers by
a version of Clausewitz’s levée en masse, using a mobilization strategy based
on effective religiously-based propaganda, tangible rewards, and fearsome
punishment. It has focused on the local themes that have always appealed
to some groups within the Muslim majority of the greater Middle East,
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including reestablishing a powerful caliphate, driving out foreign powers, protecting the sacred places of Islam, controlling the region’s natural
energy resources, and, finally, producing a righteous version of social justice
by overthrowing all authoritarian regimes. ISIS also enjoys the reputation
of being the richest jihadist organization at present, capable of persuading
citizens of some 80 countries to travel to join its struggle. In both Iraq and
Syria, ISIS has managed to forge powerful relationships with Sunni tribes
with grievances against Shia Muslim-majority governments.
ISIS is part of a social movement that describes itself as the leader of the
global Salafi jihadist community, similar to al Qaeda’s claim to be the
vanguard of the Salafi jihadist movement. ISIS is attempting to become a
mass unified social movement by demonstrating almost miraculous success
in a short period of time in Iraq and Syria. It also has aspirations to support insurrections in the Arabian Peninsula, beginning with Saudi Arabia.
Further afield, it has seeded nascent groups in the Sinai, Libya, Algeria, and
the Af/Pak region. In addition, the well-established Boko Haram group has
pledged allegiance to ISIS.

The Enemy’s Weaknesses
Despite its quick success, ISIS is not militarily strong in a conventional
sense. It has no defense against American and coalition airstrikes. It has not
been successful over the long run against determined Kurdish ground forces
in either Iraq or Syria. Its rapid initial success is based on a superior guerrilla
strategy coupled to its ability to terrorize its opposition; this initial success
must be sustained, but holding territory is proving more difficult over the
long run. Similarly, over the long run ISIS will need to continue to generate large amounts of revenue to sustain its operations. It will inevitably give
priority to its military operations, which will raise discontent among its
subject Sunni population who accede to ISIS not out of love, but because
of grievances against the Shia. However, it appears unlikely that ISIS will
be able to generate the revenue it needs. American “strategic patience” in its
air campaign is paying dividends by reducing ISIS revenues from petroleum
smuggling and other criminal enterprises. Furthermore, its enemies among
the Gulf nations have taken steps to stem donations from private sources.
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One of the strategic hinge issues is the internal war among local jihadist
groups. While ISIS has emerged as the most powerful group in terms of
resources and ability to draw new members, it is weakened by its unwillingness to achieve a meaningful detente with al Qaeda and other jihadist
groups despite its claim to the caliphate. ISIS would be strengthened by
such a detente, but it seems highly unlikely in the short or long term. The
barbaric public atrocities that have somehow inspired foreigners to travel to
join ISIS have, at the same time, undermined its brand in the Middle East
with the vast majority of Muslims in the most powerful countries. Finally,
to succeed, ISIS needs to live up to its slogan “remaining and expanding.” If
it can be contained or rolled back in the territories it occupies, it could lose
its advantage of being seen as a winner worthy of fear, if not respect.

Recommendations
The following recommendations are based on information provided in
this case study. Where direct U.S. military involvement is suggested, this is
always intended to be a limited, mission-specific involvement such as the
use of temporary direct action by Special Forces or air strikes. Such recommendations should not be understood to mean a massive involvement of
conventional forces at the level of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Counterterrorism Recommendations
On balance, the competition between al Qaeda and ISIS is a zero-sum
game: the U.S. cannot degrade one without strengthening the other.
However, the counterterrorism and police measures used against ISIS
can be adapted to degrade al Qaeda as well. For example, measures taken
against an ISIS smuggling network would also affect al Qaeda capabilities.
To address the ancient issue of smuggling requires the use of all the tools
at the U.S. coalition’s disposal in the areas of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counter narrative. Importantly, American operations need to
be executed in the context of a clear strategy, including publicly articulated
and resourced goals and objectives. As it is unrealistic to expect to stop all
smuggling into and out of Syria and Iraq, any anti-smuggling effort would
need to discriminate between high-priority and low-priority targets. For
example, coalition forces and intelligence assets could decide to target high-
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value operations such as smuggling of people, arms, petroleum products,
and historical artifacts. The U.S. also would need to give clear warnings that
individuals engaging in such smuggling are considered to be members of
ISIS, not innocent civilians.
U.S. counterterrorism resources include police, intelligence agencies, and
the military. These efforts are both domestic and foreign and include a
coalition of allies. In a successful campaign against ISIS, allied efforts are
crucial, particularly in countries where jihadists rally to the ISIS banner.
Fortunately, this coalition is already in place and, at one level or another,
the U.S. works with countries sharing a counterterrorism interest. The U.S.
can greatly strengthen counterterrorism efforts by providing technical assistance to our allies, especially in forensic science and intelligence, two fields
in which American technology is paramount. The key to success is sharing
information among components and resourcing the analysis of data. Each
country in the coalition must be responsible for its own enforcement; problems will always arise around data that is not shared.
Counterinsurgency theory and practice has risen and fallen over the last
decade. There has been controversy concerning whether al Qaeda and ISIS
should be addressed as a counterterrorism or a counterinsurgency problem
set. Despite the hot political aspects of this debate, a cold eye on the nature
of ISIS and al Qaeda reveals that both organizations are promoters and participants in transnational insurgencies and use terrorism as a major weapon.
To be effective in the current atmosphere, the U.S. can make headway in
counterinsurgency by using military and intelligence means against perceived ISIS strengths. For ISIS, legitimacy is based on success. By thwarting
success, the U.S. and its allies can degrade the group’s brand and its legitimacy. To cite one example, ISIS financial strength allows it to fund groups
like Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) in the Sinai. ABM has suffered severely
under the Egyptian military campaign against it, but it has been able to
improve its operations by declaring allegiance to ISIS. Being able to fund
and arm groups like this is an important part of what gives ISIS legitimacy
in the eyes of ABM members and other jihadist groups with ambitions of
their own, whether in Libya, Algeria, or the Sahel.
Finally, a key component is the need to put the occasional ISIS success in
context. For example, it is not enough to note that ISIS uses classic guerrilla
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warfare strategy that relies on the media and propaganda as much as on
force of arms. The U.S. and its coalition allies need to use that knowledge to
note that when ISIS forces lose ground in one area, their small-unit tactics
using multiple suicide-vehicle-borne IEDs and their ability to move quickly
allow them to mount successful surprise attacks. These attacks are “successful” if they manage to distract the media from recent coalition success on a
wider scale and portray ISIS success as a change in momentum. Nevertheless, ISIS will not be able to hold the territory if coalition forces mount a
determined counterattack.
From the beginning of its involvement, the U.S. has prioritized air strikes
on economic targets within ISIS-held territory. Significantly increasing
these strikes could over time degrade this source of legitimacy. Meanwhile
all the local counterinsurgency efforts would remain the responsibility of
local forces, ideally using subnational forces that possess a strong unity of
purpose, with U.S. technical assistance and training. In locales such as Syria,
Iraq, Libya, and Yemen, the U.S. may not be able to rely solely on local
forces in the immediate and mid term. U.S. and coalition military forces
tailored to the situation may need to be part of the military solution in
such cases, whether through an air campaign or through ground forces at a
level well below that of either the Iraq or Afghan wars.

Counter Narrative Recommendations
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency programs need a counter narrative to transform operational success into political success. Like any effective political narrative, the anti-ISIS narrative must be composed of positive
information about the coalition as well as negative information about ISIS.
To be credible, both must be fact-based and consistent with the evidence.
Posting accurate data online and using social media to lead individuals
to that data could be powerful tools. However, such programs cannot be
identified as a psychological operations campaign. They need to be part
of an information campaign with high standards of accuracy and international credibility, delivered via all modern social media as well as traditional
media. For example, if a nongovernmental group were to tabulate and update atrocities that ISIS itself claims, such a database could be an effective
resource for journalists and others. The database would need to be timely
and constantly available. While various NGOs and think tanks currently
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track ISIS activities that experts use piecemeal, creating an online clearinghouse for this work could be a useful first step for the U.S. government or a
privately funded effort.
This approach could be difficult in its start-up phase. But without reliable
public information, the counter narrative war on ISIS likely cannot be
won—if winning means reducing the threat to the international order to
acceptable levels by stopping the spread of jihadist cells across the globe and
discrediting the ideology that spawns them.
One conclusion to be drawn from al-Suri’s analysis of the lessons learned
in the Muslim Brotherhood’s failed Syrian insurrection is that the sensitive
pressure points for a jihadist group like ISIS become clear. The greatest successes by ISIS in this regard suggest the potential for their greatest vulnerabilities to be exploited. For example, if the U.S. were to force ISIS into a
war of attrition beginning with areas adjacent to or in Kurdish territories,
essentially to achieve some strategic depth for the Kurds, we could damage
more than the resultant military losses might suggest. Such an operation
would begin to erode ISIS’s propaganda advantage, attacking the basis of its
consistent propaganda slogan of “remaining and expanding” by demonstrating that ISIS cannot expand into Kurdish-declared no-go zones. One could
make the same case for Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq and Syria. To succeed in
this effort, the U.S. would need to lead the coalition in significantly arming
and training Kurdish forces and Sunni Arab tribes directly, based on best
military estimates of requirements. Political objections to such a course by
local governments constitute a serious obstacle to direct efforts with subnational groups; but for the U.S. to continue to heed such objections would be
nothing less than giving up a powerful tool with a record of success.
The U.S. would also need to enhance its tactical air campaign considerably
while maintaining its current strategic campaign against economic targets.
As this program becomes successful, the U.S. could work with the Iraqi
Army to pursue similar campaigns against geographically significant targets
held or under attack by ISIS, before eventually turning to a campaign to retake Mosul. We could then simultaneously declare the creation of coalition
expeditionary quick-strike units, including U.S. Special Forces and Marines,
and proceed with quick temporary strikes inside Iraq and eventually Syria
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at strategic points. This would clearly demonstrate that ISIS is not a state
and cannot protect the territory it now holds.
These military moves would not be meaningful without an accompanying
and coordinated strategic narrative. The narrative would have two parts. In
the first part, Muslim coalition partners (Egypt would need to be a part of
this campaign) would start a sustained campaign against the Islamic pretentions and arguments broadcast by ISIS. This campaign would include technical religious arguments offered by recognized religious authorities. These
arguments would not be difficult to construct, but they would need to be
sustained and not abandoned when they become subject to counterattacks
by ISIS and its jihadist sympathizers.
The second aspect of this counter narrative campaign would focus on the
basic fallacy at the heart of the ISIS group’s strategy, beginning with the
strategic flaw of trying to hold territory in the center of Muslim lands without any allies, economy of its own, or strategic advantage. This campaign
could also focus on the non-religious aspects of a state. Such attacks already
exist in Arabic on Christian Arab websites and argue that the Islamic State
is a state without borders, without recognition from any state, without the
ability to defend itself, without an economy outside of criminal enterprises,
without any foreign embassies, and so on. In short, the political counter
narrative would need to be basic, straightforward, and relentless in all forms
of media. The U.S. could lead this, but through a public-private partnership
that would engage the creative energies of the private sector—coordinated
and supported but not dictated by the government. Such a campaign would
need to include Muslim-American groups and collaboration with Middle
Eastern partners as much as feasible.

Final Recommendations
The most important task for U.S. planners is to focus on how ISIS is carrying out its doctrine and strategy, to identify how it is adapting to U.S.
pressure, and how it views victory as an organization. Most of the elements
needed to defeat ISIS are in place. The American military has spoken of
“strategic patience” to explain the slow, some would say cautious, pace of
operations. The coalition’s emphasis on hitting economic targets is gradually paying dividends by first slowing and then significantly reducing the
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ISIS group’s revenue from petroleum sales and other criminal activities.
Local populations have on occasion indicated to reporters that they recognize and appreciate the coalition’s focus on avoiding civilian casualties
during airstrikes. Airstrikes against targets of opportunity in the open have
reduced the ISIS group’s ability to mass forces against vulnerable targets or
reinforce its own units when they come under attack in Iraq.
In the endgame, the U.S. will need to reconsider its policy of not using
forward spotters for precision airstrikes in cities and towns. When coalition
fighters first struck targets in al-Raqqa, local residents reported that ISIS
fighters fled the city. However, we should expect that after experiencing the
coalition’s policy of restraint, ISIS would continue to hide among the population in large cities, especially Mosul, to impede Iraqi or Kurdish forces. Placing U.S. Special Forces or Marines with allied ground forces would greatly
assist clearing operations. The obvious problems with such a decision are the
likelihood of American casualties and the perception that Americans and
Iranian forces are fighting together against the Sunni population.
While American military involvement in Iraq and Syria is important to
contain ISIS, it is insufficient to defeat ISIS or al Qaeda over the long
run. Another key part of coalition success is to continue to focus on first
containing and then reversing ISIS, not only on the ground but also in its
crucial advantage in communications and propaganda. The U.S. would reap
benefits from continuing to target ISIS communications facilities and finding ways to wage cyber war against its online propaganda servers.
Even more important than attacking physical aspects of ISIS communications, the U.S. and its allied coalition need to develop a multi-tiered
counter narrative. The U.S. may encourage Muslim-majority allies to
consistently address the religious aspects of ISIS communications. Saudi
Arabia and Egypt have a large role to play in this, and their efforts should
be encouraged and supported technically. A joint fusion center to produce
translations of statements and fatwas of major Muslim religious scholars
or statements by recognized Islamic institutions would ensure that nonArabic speakers hear rebuttals to the ISIS group’s multilingual output. For
its part, the U.S. response should be crafted as though it were a high-quality
political or advertising campaign against a rival, using classic opposition
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research and reports that are factual and convincing, not polemical. Providing reports to the international press with fact-checked statistics on ISIS
crimes, its destruction of mosques and beloved historical landmarks, its
involvement in human trafficking, and so on could inform a widely dispersed population of events about which they are now unaware. Information confirmed and reported by local press sources would likely be more
effective than statements by American officials.
While difficult, defeating ISIS militarily could well prove the easiest part
of the struggle. Unless the U.S. and its partners also succeed in discrediting
its ideology, we should expect current trends to continue until either the
movement burns itself out or local populations somehow manage to destroy it—neither of which is guaranteed. The anti-ISIS coalition thus must
fashion cost-effective strategies to contain ISIS militarily while working together to discredit its legitimacy. The overarching premise of the American
response should be that ISIS is a long-term violent threat of a hostile transnational social movement, wrapped in a Salafi jihadist cover. Comparisons
to historical movements, such as the Anarchist movement before World
War I, could be used to show how transnational violence begets more
violence and does not build healthy societies. History has shown that we
should expect the ISIS/al Qaeda phenomenon to reconstitute itself under a
new name and new leadership in the event we manage to destroy its current
organization and top leadership. As long as their ideas remain credible and
even appealing to some, the threat of anarchistic violence will remain.

Discussion Questions
1. This case study lists some ISIS strengths and weaknesses. How would
you characterize the ISIS group’s greatest strengths and greatest weaknesses?
2. In your opinion, which of the recommendations in this case study are
the most useful? Which are the least useful? What other countermeasures could the U.S. take against ISIS?
3. Should the U.S. continue to target al Qaeda forces in Syria? Explain.
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Study Guide
Discussion Questions — from the text

CHAPTER ONE
1.	When al-Baghdadi sent Abu Muhammad al-Jolani to Syria and funded
his startup organization, this organization initially fell outside of American concern. What steps might be taken to help focus on and prevent
similar startups?
2.	How might the U.S. and its allies have better exploited the emerging
split between al-Baghdadi (ISIS) and al-Jolani (al-Nusra)?
3.	By killing al-Zarqawi, the U.S. severely weakened the capabilities of al
Qaeda in Iraq, yet only a few years later, al-Baghdadi was able to revive
AQI and radically expand its size and influence under the label of IS.
What factors account for this dramatic success?
4.	The “surge” in Iraq came close to destroying AQI. What might have been
some cost-effective steps the U.S. could have taken to finish the job?
5.	ISIS has destroyed the Sykes-Picot border between Syria and Iraq, established by France and Great Britain after World War I. Can the borders
ever be redrawn as they once were? Would a different configuration be
achievable today? If so, what?
6.	How can al-Suri’s five prerequisites for a clandestine jihadist group—
program, leadership, strategy, funding, and allegiance—be used to
analyze Islamic State’s strengths and vulnerabilities?
7.	Some analysts have referred to ISIS as generating a civil war within
Islam. How does al-Qurashi’s definition of revolution apply?
8.	Is ISIS fomenting a civil war for leadership in a territory or establishing
the basis for a revolution? Explain.

CHAPTER TWO
1.	The untitled paper found in al-Zawahiri’s laptop—most likely al-Suri’s
work—describes three stages of guerrilla warfare. What steps could a
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government take to keep the first stage of guerrilla warfare (attrition
through hit-and-run tactics used by the guerrillas) from devolving
into the second stage (equilibrium between the mujahedeen and
government forces)?
2.	Al-Suri’s jihadist global model has three components: (1) a clandestine
central leadership circle; (2) a coordination circle of regional jihadist
insurrections; and (3) a “call” circle of individual and small-cell terrorism behind enemy lines. In what ways do al Qaeda and the Islamic State
follow this model? In what ways do they diverge from this model?
3.	Develop a counterstrategy to attack the three key components of alSuri’s model outlined above.
4.	How important is the role of politics for a government facing guerrilla
warfare? What kind of political messages have worked in the past?
What differences, if any, should there be between political messaging
during a conflict with jihadists versus political messaging against a more
familiar left-wing insurgency?
5.	Setting the differences in their ideologies aside, how would you compare the ISIS group’s conduct of war with Mao’s wars against Japan and
Nationalist Chinese forces, or any other left-wing insurrection with
which you are familiar?
6.	Using al-Suri’s analytical template for clandestine jihadist organizations, do you think that ISIS or al Qaeda will pose a greater threat to
U.S. interests in the long run?
7.	With al-Suri’s template in mind, how would you recommend the U.S.
government decrease the likelihood of a strategic alliance between al
Qaeda elements in Syria and ISIS at some point in the future?
8.	The U.S. government devised a sophisticated network to attack funding sources for al Qaeda. What steps would you recommend to reduce
funding for ISIS?
9.	Is ISIS more like a clandestine organization or more like a state? Explain.
10.	Al-Suri’s definition of the ideal conditions for jihadists seems to describe conditions in both Syria and Iraq at the present time. How
could the U.S. government devise a cost-effective strategy and tactics to
weaken the conditions that help jihadists?

isis: the terrorist group that would be a state

73

11.	The jihadists’ strategy is to increase the costs, in terms of both blood
and treasure, of the U.S. presence in the region, thereby forcing Americans to leave the greater Middle East and allowing jihadists to fill the
political vacuum. In what ways can the U.S. attack this strategy?
12.	How does the ISIS group’s use of brutality and terrorism line up with
other insurgencies with which you are familiar? Does the level of brutality matter to the outcome ISIS seeks?
13.	What steps might the U.S. take (without occupying territory) to help
diminish sectarian polarization in Syria and Iraq?

CHAPTER THREE
1.	Much of the ISIS group’s political propaganda involves the use of
Islamic symbols and popular beliefs. How can the U.S. and its coalition
allies counter this propaganda (for example, the use of the concept of
the Apocalypse) without making matters worse? What would be the
effect of ignoring this part of ISIS propaganda?
2.	How important are Kurdish forces in the battle against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria? Should the U.S. arm the Kurds directly, even if the governments
of Iraq and Turkey object? In other words, how would you make the
tradeoff between military gains against ISIS versus political complications with allies?
3.	What elements would you include in an information war against ISIS?
4.	ISIS uses “culture and framing” in much of its public dialogue via
terms and arguments that resonate with the culture of its target audiences to criticize its enemies, including the United States. How could
the U.S. frame ISIS attacks on historical and religious landmarks that
are much loved by local populations in ways that would resonate in
the greater Middle East? What would be the military’s role, if any,
in this messaging? Can you think of other issues that would be more
effective to reframe?
5.	What factors contribute to the success of ISIS on social media? What
countermeasures are available to mitigate that success?
6.	ISIS uses networks of Sunni Arab tribes in Syria and Iraq to prosecute
its war against the region. Much of its work with tribes was inspired
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by the successful U.S. strategy against al Qaeda insurgents during the
“Surge” in Iraq. From your experience, could the U.S. replicate its work
with Sunni tribes in present day Iraq and Syria without a large military
footprint? Explain.

CHAPTER FOUR
1.	This case study lists some ISIS strengths and weaknesses. How would you
characterize the ISIS group’s greatest strengths and greatest weaknesses?
2.	In your opinion, which of the recommendations in this case study are
the most useful? Which are the least useful? What other countermeasures could the U.S. take against ISIS?
3.	Should the U.S. continue to target al Qaeda forces in Syria? Explain.
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